A Path Forward: Reducing Gun and Gang Violence in Canada

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

AND GANG VIOLENCE IN CANADA

Report of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and

National Security

Honourable Jim Carr, Chair

APRIL 2022

44th

PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

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A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN AND

GANG VIOLENCE IN CANADA

Report of the Standing Committee on

Public Safety and National Security

Hon. Jim Carr

Chair

APRIL 2022

44th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

NOTICE TO READER

Reports from committees presented to the House of Commons

Presenting a report to the House is the way a committee makes public its findings and recommendations

on a particular topic. Substantive reports on a subject-matter study usually contain a synopsis of the

testimony heard, the recommendations made by the committee, as well as the reasons for those

recommendations.

iii

STANDING COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY

AND NATIONAL SECURITY

CHAIR

Hon. Jim Carr

VICE-CHAIRS

Raquel Dancho

Kristina Michaud

MEMBERS

Paul Chiang

Pam Damoff

Dane Lloyd

Alistair MacGregor

Ron McKinnon

Taleeb Noormohamed

Doug Shipley

Tako Van Popta

Sameer Zuberi

OTHER MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT WHO PARTICIPATED

Rachel Bendayan

Kody Blois

Larry Brock

Todd Doherty

Jean-Denis Garon

Damien C. Kurek

Philip Lawrence

Sébastien Lemire

Tim Louis

Larry Maguire

Eric Melillo

Karen Vecchio

CLERK OF THE COMMITTEE

Wassim Bouanani

LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT

Parliamentary Information, Education and Research Services

Lyne Casavant, Analyst

Chloé Forget, Analyst

THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON

PUBLIC SAFETY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

has the honour to present its

THIRD REPORT

Pursuant to its mandate under Standing Order 108(2), the committee has studied gun control,

illegal arms trafficking and the increase in gun crimes committed by members of street gangs and

has agreed to report the following:

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................................. 1

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN AND GANG VIOLENCE IN CANADA ....................... 9

Chapter 1—Introduction ................................................................................................................. 9

1.1 Context of the Study .......................................................................................................... 9

1.2 Organization of the Report .......................................................................................... 10

Chapter 2—Understanding Gun and Gang Violence ........................................................ 11

2.1 Defining Gun Violence and Improving National Firearms Data .................. 12

2.2 The Rise of Firearm-Related Violent Crimes in Canada ................................. 14

2.3 Type of Firearm Used in the Commission of Violent Crimes ........................ 15

2.4 Understanding the Origin of Crime Guns in Canada ........................................ 16

2.5 The Involvement of Gangs in Gun Violence and the Trafficking of

Drugs and Firearms ........................................................................................................ 21

2.6 Trends Observed in Major Urban Centres Regarding Gun and Gang

Violence ............................................................................................................................... 24

2.6.1 Surge of Gun Violence in Public Spaces ....................................................... 24

2.6.2 More Shots Being Fired During Shootings ................................................. 25

2.6.3 Greater Involvement of Young Persons in Gun Violence ..................... 26

2.6.4 Greater Accessibility of Illegal Firearms and a General Sense of

Impunity Among Youth and Gang Members ............................................. 26

2.7 Addressing the Urgent Need for Better Data and Intelligence

Regarding Gun and Gang Violence in Canada: Recommendations of

the Committee ................................................................................................................... 28

Chapter 3—Root Causes and Prevention of Gun And Gang Violence ....................... 30

3.1 Root Causes of Gun and Gang Violence .................................................................. 30

3.2 Understanding the Violence in Gang Culture ...................................................... 34

3.2.1 Gangs Prey on Vulnerabilities .......................................................................... 34

3.2.2 The Concept of Hypermasculinity .................................................................. 35

3.3 Youth Interventions and Diversion Programs .................................................... 36

viii

3.4 Preventing Gun and Gang Violence and Youth and Young Adults from

Participating in Gangs: Recommendations of the Committee ..................... 39

Chapter 4—Law Enforcement Agencies and the Criminal Justice System ............. 44

4.1 Overview of the Roles and Responsabilities of Law Enforcement

Agencies ............................................................................................................................... 44

4.1.1 Federal Law Enforcement Agencies .............................................................. 44

4.1.2 Provincial and Municipal Police Services ................................................... 45

4.1.3 Indigenous Police Services ................................................................................ 46

4.1.3.1 Akwesasne .................................................................................................. 46

4.2 The Need for Law Enforcement Agencies to Be Appropriately

Funded ................................................................................................................................. 47

4.2.1 The Need for Indigenous Police Services to Be Adequately

Funded ....................................................................................................................... 49

4.3 The Need to Strengthen Border Controls ............................................................. 52

4.4 The Need for Enhanced Collaboration, Coordination and

Partnerships ...................................................................................................................... 55

4.4.1 Collaboration with Indigenous Police Forces ........................................... 58

4.5 The Need for Adequately Resourced Prosecution Services and

Appropriate Sentencing ................................................................................................ 59

Chapter 5—Gun Control ............................................................................................................... 63

5.1 Classification of Firearms and Firearm Offences ............................................... 63

5.2 Ban on Certain Firearms and Buyback Program ............................................... 64

5.2.1 Ban on Handguns .................................................................................................. 65

5.2.2 Ban on Assault-Style Weapons and Buyback Program ......................... 69

5.2.3 International Experience ................................................................................... 71

5.3 High-Capacity Magazines and Ammunition ......................................................... 73

5.4 Illegally Made Firearms ............................................................................................... 76

5.4.1 Importation of Gun Parts ................................................................................... 76

5.4.2 Ghost Guns ............................................................................................................... 78

5.5 Verification of Licences When Transferring a Non-Restricted

Firearm ................................................................................................................................ 79

Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................... 82

APPENDIX A LIST OF WITNESSES................................................................................................... 83

APPENDIX B LIST OF BRIEFS ............................................................................................................ 87

REQUEST FOR GOVERNMENT RESPONSE .................................................................................. 89

SUPPLEMENTARY OPINION OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY OF CANADA ................ 91

SUPPLEMENTARY OPINION OF THE BLOC QUÉBÉCOIS ....................................................... 97

SUPPLEMENTARY OPINION OF THE NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF CANADA ......... 99

LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

As a result of their deliberations committees may make recommendations which they

include in their reports for the consideration of the House of Commons or the Government.

Recommendations related to this study are listed below.

Recommendation 1

That the Government of Canada create and fund an interdisciplinary National

Centre of Excellence dedicated to collecting Canadian specific data and

conducting research on firearms violence. ................................................................ 28

Recommendation 2

That the Government of Canada provide additional resources to Statistics

Canada and law enforcement agencies to ensure consistency in the collection

of data related to firearms smuggling, the use of firearms in the commission of

a crime, and the use of firearms in gang-related crime. ............................................. 28

Recommendation 3

That the Government of Canada update the federal firearms program to

require police agencies to submit for tracing firearms that were acquired by

police in relation to criminal activity or sent in for destruction. ................................. 29

Recommendation 4

That the Government of Canada create uniform standards for tracing firearms

involved in the commission of a crime, and that police services be adequately

resourced in order to enhance tracing capabilities. ................................................... 29

Recommendation 5

That the Government of Canada mandate the Royal Canadian Mounted Police

to implement effective ongoing training for Royal Canadian Mounted Police

officers to close gaps within current Canadian National Firearms Tracing

Centre’s efforts. ....................................................................................................... 29

Recommendation 6

That the Government of Canada increase funding for the Canadian Criminal

Intelligence Service to enable comprehensive intelligence sharing across all

police services in Canada to improve their effectiveness in tracing firearms and

combatting organized and gang-related crime. ......................................................... 29

Recommendation 7

That the Government of Canada focus on diverting youth and young adults

from gang culture as an effective measure to prevent gun and gang violence

and to prevent young people from ending up in the justice system. .......................... 41

Recommendation 8

That the Government of Canada expand the National Crime Prevention

Strategy to provide streamlined and stable funding for community

organizations delivering culturally specific, key community social programs

aimed at addressing the root causes of violence involving youth and young

adults, such as:

• gang diversion programs focused on youth and young adults,

particularly pre-gang involvement;

• gang diversion programs for Indigenous Peoples and racialized

Canadians;

• gang exit programs that incorporate the experience of former gang

members who can provide support and advice to individuals looking to

leave gang life;

• victim-led and trauma informed community services designed to

support families and communities recover from the violence of

shootings. ..................................................................................................... 41

Recommendation 9

That the Government of Canada recognize Indigenous community

organizations engaged in gang diversion and community safety as policing

services and fund these organizations to work on mental health services,

peacekeeping, security, accountability and youth diversion in their respective

communities. ........................................................................................................... 42

Recommendation 10

That the Government of Canada host a National Gun and Gang Summit in

Ottawa for community organizations working on preventing youth and young

adults from being involved in gang activities and assisting those already

involved to exit this lifestyle. .................................................................................... 42

Recommendation 11

That the Government of Canada recognize that serious crimes involving

firearms and drug trafficking should bear serious penalties given the threat to

public safety, and that violent offenders should be kept off our streets to

protect the public, while a public health response should be adopted to deal

with people suffering from substance abuse. ............................................................ 42

Recommendation 12

That the Government of Canada:

• recognize that the high profitability of the illicit drug trade, which

contributes to the opioid epidemic in Canada, gives rise to gun and gang

violence, as well as the illicit tobacco trade;

• recognize the need for greater funding for public education to reduce

stigma associated with substance abuse and addiction, treat trauma,

and expand access to treatment, and recovery services;

• study the role of harm reduction in preventing gun and gang violence;

and

• increase support to divert individuals suffering from addiction from

being involved in the criminal justice system in favour of rehabilitation. ........ 42

Recommendation 13

That the Government of Canada decriminalize the simple possession of all illicit

drugs as called upon by the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police and public

health officials, in consultations with provincial authorities and other

stakeholders, while not impeding law enforcement’s ability to prosecute the

trafficking of illicit drugs. .......................................................................................... 43

Recommendation 14

That the Government of Canada recognize the importance of increasing police

resources to combat gang violence, with particular emphasis on enhancing

youth and young adult gang diversion efforts, while encouraging greater

diversity in police services. ....................................................................................... 49

Recommendation 15

That the Government of Canada increase funding to the Akwesasne Mohawk

Police Service, promote economic development in Akwesasne, and encourage

the surrounding police of jurisdiction to strengthen collaboration and

information sharing with Akwesasne and other border communities to ensure

improvement in law enforcement’s ability to intercept illegal firearms at the

provincial and international border. ......................................................................... 51

Recommendation 16

That the Government of Canada fully implement the three recommendations

from Public Safety Canada’s 2019 report entitled Evaluation of the Akwesasne

Organized Crime Initiative:

• Continue to support the Akwesasne Mohawk Police Service in building

their capacity to ensure their full participation on the Joint Investigative

Team and contribution to the disruption of organized crime in and

around Akwesasne.

• Identify the appropriate funding mechanism (e.g. multi-year

contribution agreement or grant) to support the Akwesasne Mohawk

Police Service’s sustained long-term participation in the Joint

Investigative Team.

• Explore opportunities to streamline administrative requirements for the

Akwesasne Mohawk Police Service and internal Public Safety Canada

practices to increase efficiency and address existing burdens on both

the recipient and Public Safety Canada staff. This could include revising

reporting requirements, considering longer term funding and increasing

coordination with other programs. ................................................................ 51

Recommendation 17

That the Government of Canada ensure that as it co-develops a legislative

framework for First Nations policing which recognizes it as an essential service,

that Indigenous police services like the Akwesasne Mohawk Police Service are

part of the co-development process. ........................................................................ 51

Recommendation 18

That the Government of Canada recognize that smuggling is a significant

contributor to gun and gang violence in Canada and that more resources must

be allocated to firearms smuggling. .......................................................................... 54

Recommendation 19

That the Government of Canada investigate the need for enhanced border

surveillance of international commercial rail operations and ocean freight

shipping operations. ................................................................................................. 54

Recommendation 20

That the Government of Canada allocate additional human and financial

resources to the Canada Border Services Agency to enable them to better

investigate and apprehend those attempting to smuggle illegal firearms into

Canada, including innovative technological solutions. ............................................... 54

Recommendation 21

That the Government of Canada develop a legal framework that distinguishes

between regulatory and criminal firearms offenses in order to provide limited

police resources the ability to focus on violent crime and gang activity. .................... 64

Recommendation 22

That the Government of Canada develop a standardized schedule and

definitions of prohibited firearms within the Criminal Code of Canada, with an

emphasis on simplicity and consistency. ................................................................... 64

Recommendation 23

That the Government of Canada fund additional research into the prevalence

of the domestic diversion of firearms, including considering implementing a

reasonable limit on the number of restricted firearms a person can own should

it be found to be a significant factor in domestic diversion. ....................................... 68

Recommendation 24

That the Government of Canada as part of its prohibition on certain firearms

implement a mandatory buyback program following consultation with relevant

stakeholders. ........................................................................................................... 71

Recommendation 25

That the Government of Canada study models adopted by other jurisdictions,

like the U.K. and Australia, in banning certain firearms in their jurisdictions in

order to better understand what a made-in-Canada solution would look like............ 72

Recommendation 26

That the Government of Canada review the importation, domestic

manufacturing, sale, and possession of all firearms magazines that can be

easily modified to hold more than the maximum permitted capacity. ....................... 75

Recommendation 27

That the Government of Canada amend current legislation to require a

possession and acquisition license to purchase magazines in the same way as

ammunition. ............................................................................................................ 75

Recommendation 28

That the Government of Canada regulate the possession, sale, and import of

firearm component parts such as barrels, slides, and trigger assemblies. .................. 79

Recommendation 29

That the Government of Canada further investigate the prevalence of, and

develop a strategy to counteract the manufacturing of illegal firearms or

ghost guns. ............................................................................................................... 79

Recommendation 30

That the Government of Canada amend the definition of a firearm in Section 2

of the Criminal Code to include in its specification of firearms and firearm parts

“blank castings of frames or receivers not yet capable of holding various firing

components.” .......................................................................................................... 79

Recommendation 31

That the Royal Canadian Mounted Police ensure that the Chief Firearms Officer

verify all information contained in a possession and acquisition license

application. .............................................................................................................. 81

Recommendation 32

That the Government of Canada, amend licensing regulations to clarify the

licence verification provisions by stating that a seller must provide a potential

buyer's licence number to the Registrar so that it can confirm its validity in the

system before issuing a reference number authorizing the transfer of a firearm. ...... 81

Recommendation 33

That the Government of Canada amend the law to ensure that individuals

under a protection order related to intimate partner violence automatically

have their possession and acquisition licence revoked and their firearms

surrendered to the Crown. ....................................................................................... 81

Recommendation 34

That the Government of Canada introduce legislation as soon as possible that

take into account the recommendations of this report. ............................................ 82

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

AND GANG VIOLENCE IN CANADA

CHAPTER 1—INTRODUCTION

1.1 Context of the Study

The motion that led to this study was put forward in the House of Commons in reaction

to the intensification of gun and gang violence in Montreal and the metropolitan area,

which had involved numerous deadly shootings in public spaces. Recognizing the trauma

of gun and gang violence and its impacts on health and wellbeing, the House of

Commons adopted a motion on 7 December 2021 instructing the Standing Committee

on Public Safety and National Security (the Committee) “to undertake as a priority a

study on gun control, illegal arms trafficking and the increase in gun crimes committed

by members of street gangs.”

This study had to be undertaken in a timely manner as various communities across

Canada have recently observed a disturbing surge in gun and gang violence, which has

had a devastating impact on them. The trauma of such violence not only affects its direct

victims but also extends to families and communities who are exposed as witnesses.

Gun and gang violence needs to be urgently addressed: public safety is paramount.

Accordingly, the Committee quickly started this important study and allocated seven

meetings to hear from approximately 50 witnesses who generously agreed to share their

expertise and experiences with the Committee to curb illegal firearms and gun violence.

Throughout the study, the Committee heard a clear message from witnesses: one policy

or program alone will not fix the problem of gun violence in our communities. It is a

multifaceted issue that requires reflection and a comprehensive set of solutions that

include data collection and research, prevention and intervention, as well as

coordination and collaboration between all levels of governments, law enforcement

agencies, social services, grassroots organizations, Indigenous peoples and local

communities.

From the outset, the Committee recognizes that several areas aimed at combatting gun

and gang violence, such as prevention and justice, are matters of shared jurisdiction and

House of Commons, Debates, 44

Parliament, 1

Session, 7 December 2021.

that collaboration between the different levels of government is required to tackle this

issue. The Committee’s recommendations arising from this study are to be reviewed

with that lens.

1.2 Organization of the Report

The report is divided into five chapters, including this introduction. Chapter 2 provides

an overview of the data collected throughout the study regarding firearms smuggling

and trafficking, gun violence and the involvement of street gangs. It also discusses trends

observed in various communities across the country in relation to gun and gang

violence. The third chapter looks at the root causes of gun and gang violence, as well as

programs that are aimed at preventing youth and young adults from engaging in gang

activities and violence. The fourth chapter deals with gun control as a way to reduce gun

violence. Chapter 5 discusses law enforcement approaches and the prosecution of

firearms offences.

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

AND GANG VIOLENCE IN CANADA

CHAPTER 2—UNDERSTANDING GUN AND GANG VIOLENCE

Access to comprehensive data is crucial for informing policy, allocating resources and

taking actions designed to effectively reduce gun and gang violence, and trafficking of

firearms. For law enforcement agencies, gathering reliable data and intelligence is key to

informing policing operations, disrupting the activities of individuals and groups involved

in arms trafficking and preventing gun violence from happening in the first place. As

stated by Staff Sergeant Michael Rowe from the Vancouver Police Department,

“information is one of our key tools in conducting any type of successful law

enforcement action.”

During the Committee’s study, several witnesses presented statistics to describe how

firearms make their way into our communities, the types of firearms used in criminal

incidents and the involvement of gangs in these activities. Some of these statistics

provided conflicting views of these issues. Part of the problem can be explained by the

lack of a consistent definition applied by all police services across Canada as to what

constitutes gun violence or a “crime gun.” There are also issues with the quantity and

quality of the data collected at the national level to understand the full extent and

nature of gun and gang violence. These gaps must be addressed urgently, according to

several witnesses who appeared before the Committee. Chief Evan Bray of the Canadian

Association of Chiefs of Police noted:

Each police service does a good job of handling the crimes happening in its jurisdiction

or community, but we need to also look at it globally and enhance good data so that we

can make good decisions and try to restrict firearms and these crimes happening

in Canada.

This urgent need for better data and intelligence is recognized by the Royal Canadian

Mounted Police (RCMP), which informed the Committee of recent investments to

implement a national criminal intelligence service system:

We need a national, comprehensive picture. That’s why we are in the process of

developing a brand new, modern national criminal intelligence service system that will

be used by all police services across the country for organized crime intelligence, gang

intelligence, and included in there will be firearms intelligence.

House of Commons, Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (SECU), Evidence, 10

February 2022 (Michael Rowe, Staff Sergeant, Vancouver Police Department).

SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Evan Bray, Chief of Police, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police).

SECU, Evidence, 16 December 2021 (Stephen White, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized Policing Services,

Royal Canadian Mounted Police).

This chapter presents the data provided to the Committee during the study and their

limitations in relation to the type of firearm used in the commission of violent offences

or seized during those criminal incidents; the origin of illegal firearms found in Canada;

the rise of gun violence in recent years, particularly in urban centres; and the

involvement of gangs. To conclude, trends observed in gun and gang violence in major

cities are also discussed, based on the information provided by local police services and

stakeholders operating in these communities.

2.1 Defining Gun Violence and Improving National Firearms Data

As noted above, the Committee was told that there is no common definition of what

constitutes gun violence or a crime gun that is consistently applied across the county by

all police services. This lack of a common definition can create confusion, according to

criminal defence lawyer Solomon Friedman, who noted that

[…] the definition of “crime gun” further self-selects and obscures our focus. “Crime

gun” generally refers to firearms—including, by the way, pellet guns and replica

firearms—seized by police in the course of their duties. This includes both offence- and

public safety-related seizures. That definition does not differentiate between a handgun

used in a gang shooting and a hundred non-restricted, safely stored firearms that are

seized from an elderly gun collector who is the subject of a police wellness check

because his daughter has not heard from him in days.

The inconsistency in the application by police services of what constitutes a crime gun

was further explained by Solomon Friedman, who shared the following:

We have really anecdotal evidence coming from individual police services. I'll give you

an example. I did a murder trial by firearm, in which the Crown at one point in the

proceedings actually pulled statistics from the Ottawa Police Service about the seizure

of crime guns and the proliferation of crime guns in Ottawa. These are statistics that are

being collected locally by police services. They do not use consistent definitions from

service to service. For example, when I inquired into the definition of a crime gun, I got

an answer from the Toronto Police Service that was different from that of the Ottawa

Police Service.

In its brief, Statistics Canada recognized these limitations and the overall need to

improve national data collection in relation to firearms used in the commission of

criminal offences, “such as details about the exact type of gun, who owned it (e.g.,

accused, victim, or someone else), how it was stored or whether the owner was

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Solomon Friedman, Criminal Defence Lawyer, As an Individual).

Ibid.

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

AND GANG VIOLENCE IN CANADA

licensed.”

In fact, the Committee was informed that several changes have already been

made to address some of these limitations and that Statistics Canada continues to

collaborate with various partners, including police services, to “identify and address

critical information needs.”

Chief Evan Bray from the Canadian Association of Chiefs of

Police noted, for example, that in 2021, Statistics Canada implemented “new standard

definitions for firearms terminology related to shootings and crime guns.”

According to

the new standard definition for “crime guns” to be used by police services:

“Crime guns” are defined as a) firearms (as defined under the Criminal Code) that are

used or suspected to be used in the commission of a criminal offence, regardless of

whether the firearm was possessed legally; or b) a firearm that has an obliterated,

altered or removed serial number.

Chief Evan Bray also noted that amendments to the Uniform Crime Reporting Survey

(UCR Survey) “include new firearm codes that distinguish between seized, stolen and

recovered firearms.”

According to Chief Bray, “the first results will be expected in the

fall of this year.”

Data reported by police services to Statistics Canada through the UCR Survey or the

Homicide Survey provide a range of information related to firearms, such as “whether a

firearm was present in the commission of a violent offence and whether a victim

sustained an injury caused by a firearm.”

In the UCR Survey, for example, police

services are invited to indicate the most serious weapon present on a crime scene that

was, according to them, relevant to the commission of a violent crime. The presence of a

weapon is “defined as either used against a victim causing injury, used against a victim

without causing injury (e.g., as a threat) or was present during the offence but was not

used in any manner.”

The Homicide Survey offers more detailed information, especially

when the firearm was the cause of death, such as the ownership status of the firearm. In

2019, the Homicide Survey was redesigned

SECU, Brief, Statistics Canada, 10 February 2022, p. 9.

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Jeff Latimer, Director General, Health, Justice, Diversity and Populations,

Statistics Canada); SECU, Brief, Statistics Canada, 10 February 2022, p. 9.

SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Evan Bray, Chief of Police, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police).

SECU, Brief, Statistics Canada, 10 February 2022, p. 9.

SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Evan Bray, Chief of Police, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police).

Ibid.

SECU, Brief, Statistics Canada, 10 February 2022, p. 1.

Ibid.

[…] to address additional data needs, including: if the accused was in legal possession of

the firearm; the status of an illegally owned firearm (e.g., stolen, lost or missing); the

action type and barrel length of the firearm; whether the firearm was sent for tracing;

and the origin of the firearm (i.e., within Canada or outside).

So far, the data collected under this improved survey present high levels of “unknown”

responses or non-responses. As a result, the reliability of the data should be viewed

with caution.

2.2 The Rise of Firearm-Related Violent Crimes in Canada

Although firearm-related crimes typically represented less than 3% of all violent crimes

reported by police to Statistics Canada, at least 8,344 victims were directly impacted by

these crimes across the country in 2020, excluding the province of Quebec.

The rate

per 100,000 population in 2020 was similar to what was recorded in 2019.

However,

from 2014 to 2019, the rate “had been increasing year over year.”

Indeed, it was found

to “be 20% higher in the six years from 2015 to 2020 than over the previous six years

(2009 to 2014).”

In 2020, the highest rates of firearm-related violent crime were recorded in

Saskatchewan, Manitoba and the three territories, which may reflect higher rates of

violence more generally.

As noted by Statistics Canada:

High rates of firearm-related violent crime may be a reflection of overall high rates of

violence. The provinces where the proportion of violent crime that was firearm-related

was highest were Saskatchewan (3.9%), Alberta (3.4%) and Ontario (3.2%). This was also

the case among major cities. As in 2019, the census metropolitan areas (CMAs) with the

Ibid., p. 2.

Ibid.

The data presented by Jeff Latimer from Statistics Canada regarding firearm-related violent crime excluded

“the data from Quebec due to a high level of unknowns reported for the weapon type in violent incidents.”

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Jeff Latimer, Director General, Health, Justice, Diversity and Populations,

Statistics Canada).

In 2020, police reported a rise of firearm-related violent crimes in all the territories and some provinces. For

more information, see SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Jeff Latimer, Director General, Health, Justice,

Diversity and Populations, Statistics Canada). SECU, Brief, Statistics Canada, 10 February 2022, p. 9.

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Jeff Latimer, Director General, Health, Justice, Diversity and Populations,

Statistics Canada).

SECU, Brief, Statistics Canada, 10 February 2022, p. 2.

Ibid., p. 3.

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

AND GANG VIOLENCE IN CANADA

highest rates of firearm-related violent crime in 2020 were Regina, Brantford, Winnipeg

and Saskatoon.

Moreover, “[a]s in previous years, rates of firearm-related violent crime in 2020 were

higher in rural areas than in urban centres in most provinces.”

Police-reported statistics specific to firearm-related homicides offer a slightly different

picture. As stated by Jeff Latimer from Statistics Canada:

The national homicide rate increased for a second consecutive year in 2020, marking the

highest rate since 2005. Police reported 743 homicides in 2020—56 more than in 2019.

Of these 743 homicides, 37%, or 277, were committed with a firearm; this is a slight

increase compared to 2019.

Overall, the “rate of homicides involving firearms has generally been increasing over the

last eight years.”

In fact, according to the information provided by Statistics Canada,

firearm-related homicides saw

[…] a 91% increase from 2013 to 2020, moving from 1.45 homicides per 100,000

population in 2013 to a rate of 1.95 in 2020. As a result, the proportion of homicides

that involved a firearm rose from 26% of all homicides in 2013 to 37% in 2020.

2.3 Type of Firearm Used in the Commission of Violent Crimes

The evidence reviewed by the Committee shows that the type of firearm used most

often to commit violent crimes varies across the country. For example, in Winnipeg,

Mitch Bourbonniere, outreach worker for the Ogijiita Pimatiswin Kinamatawin,

expressed the view that it is mostly long guns and altered long guns that are used in the

commission of violent crimes.

However, in general, Statistics Canada data on police-

reported crimes show that

[i]n urban areas, firearm-related violent crime primarily involves handguns, while in

rural areas, the firearm used most commonly is a rifle or a shotgun. In some major

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 5.

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Jeff Latimer, Director General, Health, Justice, Diversity and Populations,

Statistics Canada).

Ibid.

SECU, Brief, Statistics Canada, 10 February 2022, p. 7.

SECU, Evidence, 3 February 2022 (Mitch Bourbonniere, Outreach Worker, Ogijiita Pimatiswin Kinamatawin,

As an Individual).

urban centres, handguns were used in the vast majority of firearm-related crimes,

including Toronto at 86%, Windsor at 80%, and Ottawa and Barrie both at 78%.

According to Statistics Canada police-reported data on homicides in Canada, handguns

continue to be the firearm used most often in the commission of homicides, “with about

half of all homicides committed with a handgun [49%].”

The proportion of handguns

used in homicides was higher in most provinces, except for

[…] Saskatchewan and Alberta where a rifle or shotgun was used in 83% and 45%,

respectively. This was also the case in Nova Scotia, where the type of firearm was

unknown for two-thirds of firearm-related homicides in 2020.

Statistics Canada goes on to explain:

The type of firearm used to commit homicide in Canada has changed over the past

30 years. Prior to the 1990s, rifles or shotguns were used far more frequently than

handguns. However, a shift towards the use of handguns in homicides in Canada has

been observed since the early 1990s.

Some police services are observing trends regarding the type of firearm used to commit

criminal offences in their communities. In Vancouver, for example, Staff Sergeant

Michael Rowe noted an increase in the use of illegally made firearms, also known as

“ghost guns,” and high-capacity magazines, a trend that has been observed in many

parts of the country, as discussed later in the report.

2.4 Understanding the Origin of Crime Guns in Canada

Various witnesses came forward with conflicting views and numbers in relation to the

origin of firearms used to carry out criminal offences, either within their communities or

in Canada. These differences can be explained by several factors, such as regional

disparities in the type of firearms mostly used in the commission of crimes, the

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Jeff Latimer, Director General, Health, Justice, Diversity and Populations,

Statistics Canada). As noted previously, the information provided to the Committee by Statistics Canada

excluded data from Quebec. Due to technical issues, they were unable to include them in the national

figures.

Ibid.

SECU, Brief, Statistics Canada, 10 February 2022, p. 9.

Ibid., p. 8.

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Michael Rowe, Staff Sergeant, Vancouver Police Department); See also,

SECU, Evidence, 17 February 2022 (David Bertrand, Chief Inspector, Criminal Investigative Services, Service

de police de la Ville de Montréal).

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

AND GANG VIOLENCE IN CANADA

definition used by local police services to qualify a “crime gun”, as well as the number of

firearms that are sent for tracing and effectively traced to a source. As explained later, at

the national level, a small fraction of firearms found by police services across the

country are successfully traced to a known source.

Generally, as noted by Brian Sauvé, President of the National Police Federation, “it is the

experience of law enforcement that most of these guns are illegally obtained” from the

United States (U.S.).

However, for some witnesses, it is more a mix of guns originating

from Canada and the U.S. In their opinion, diversion, which is “a process by which legal

guns turns into illegal guns, largely through theft,”

is an important factor related to the

availability of crime guns in Canada.

Based on his policing experience, Chief Inspector Benoît Dubé from the Sûreté du

Québec explained that most firearms linked to crimes seized in Quebec come from the

U.S., which means that “[we] need to focus our efforts on the borders between the

United States and Canada.”

In fact, according to Chief Inspector David Bertrand from

the Service de police de la Ville de Montréal (SPVM), approximately 80% of seized illegal

firearms in Quebec are smuggled from the U.S.

While looking into what is going on in Vancouver, the Committee learned that, based on

60 firearm tracing requests made to the Canadian National Firearms Tracing Centre

2021 in that city, “26 firearms were found to have originated in Canada, 21 were found

to have originated in the United States and 26 were not able to be traced to a known

source.”

Clearly, a great proportion of firearms were not successfully traced to a known

source. Several reasons can account for the current situation. Indeed, the Committee

Firearm tracing is the tracking of a firearm that has been found or seized by law enforcement officers to

identify its origin, figure out if the gun was imported and trace firearm ownership whenever possible.

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Brian Sauvé, President, National Police Federation).

SECU, Evidence, 17 February 2022 (Christian Pearce, Criminal Defence Counsel, Author, As an Individual).

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Benoît Dubé, Chief Inspector, Director Criminal Investigation, Sûreté du

Québec).

SECU, Evidence, 17 February 2022 (David Bertrand, Chief Inspector, Criminal Investigative Services, Service

de police de la Ville de Montréal).

The Canadian National Firearms Tracing Centre can also count on the National Forensic Laboratory Services

“which do the forensic analysis of firearms on behalf of law enforcement agencies across Canadian [sic] with

the exception of Ontario and Quebec, which have their own provincial labs.” The National Forensic

Laboratory Services is “not involved in the tracing of firearms.” They use different technologies to restore

the serial number of the firearm whenever possible. For more information, see SECU, Evidence, 1 February

2022 (Don Halina, Director General, National Forensic Laboratory Services, Royal Canadian Mounted Police).

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Michael Rowe, Staff Sergeant, Vancouver Police Department).

was reminded that tracing a firearm is a complex process that can take a long time as

“[i]t involves tracking from the point of manufacture through importation and delivery

to distributors, to retailers, out to licence and to restricted and prohibited firearms

dealers.”

Some factors increase that complexity. For example, the Committee was

informed that ghost guns are often impossible to trace through traditional systems

because of the way they are built (some are composed of 3-D printed parts or from

multiple parts from various firearms, resulting in multiple serial numbers).

Criminal

defence lawyer Solomon Friedman told the Committee that, in general, domestic

firearms are much easier to trace, which could explain why the national data in relation

to tracing, as explained below, show a greater proportion of firearms originating

in Canada.

The results of tracing also seem to vary according to the specific type of firearm. For

example, when looking into handguns seized in Ontario, Kellie Paquette, Director

General of the Canadian Firearms Program, noted that tracing data reveals that “79% of

traced handguns [in Ontario] were foreign sourced.”

Similarly, in Toronto, 86% of

successfully traced crime handguns were sourced in the U.S. in 2021, a percentage that

has continued to rise since 2019.

At the national level, RCMP Commissioner Brenda Lucki told the Committee that when

firearms can successfully be traced, the data reveal that most firearms are sourced in

Canada, not in the U.S. She stated that “[i]n the tracing Centre, of the known source,

73% were deemed to be sourced within Canada and 27% were smuggled or possibly

smuggled within the country from the U.S.”

Stephen White, RCMP Deputy

Commissioner for Specialized Policing Services, pointed out that it is important to keep

in mind that only a small number of the overall firearms seized by law enforcement are

currently traced.

He further explained:

There were over 30,000 firearms seized […] in 2020. We received tracing requests for

2,094 and were able to successfully trace 1,472. Seventy-three per cent of those were

SECU, Evidence, 16 December 2021 (Stephen White, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized Policing Services,

Royal Canadian Mounted Police).

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Michael Rowe, Staff Sergeant, Vancouver Police Department).

Ibid., (Solomon Friedman, Criminal Defence Lawyer, As an Individual).

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Kellie Paquette, Director General, Canadian Firearms Program, Royal

Canadian Mounted Police).

SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Myron Demkiw, Deputy Chief, Toronto Police Service).

SECU, Evidence, 16 December 2021 (Brenda Lucki, Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police).

Ibid., (Stephen White, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized Policing Services, Royal Canadian Mounted Police).

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

AND GANG VIOLENCE IN CANADA

deemed to be imported legally or manufactured in Canada, and 27%, as mentioned,

were smuggled or possibly smuggled. Of that 1,472, 71% were long guns and, of these,

85% were domestically sourced, while 29% were handguns, and 58% of those handguns

were identified as smuggled or possibly smuggled.

Brian Sauvé from the National Police Federation reminded the Committee that “there’s

no requirement right now for municipal, provincial, or even the RCMP detachment to

send guns for tracing unless they need to be used as evidence in court.”

The Committee also heard witnesses, like criminal defence counsel Christian Pearce,

who stated that about half of crime guns “start as legal guns owned by legitimate

Canadian gun owners. They then are stolen or otherwise find themselves into the black

market and become crime guns.”

In his opinion, diversion plays “a huge factor in the

availability of illegal firearms.”

It’s an unfortunate reality, but diversion is an extremely significant issue and the only

way to address it is by cutting out the availability on the legal side. They may be coming

theft from production facilities, as we saw at Para Ordnance many years ago, truck

theft, as we saw just a few days ago in Peterborough—fortunately those guns were

recovered—or primarily theft from legitimate gun owners, who keep safe stocks of

firearms. They become targets for break and enters to be stolen and to be turned over

to criminals at elevated prices to be used in all sorts of crime.

Similar views were presented to the Committee by Wendy Cuckier, President of the

Coalition for Gun Control, who stated:

We also know that the diversion of legal guns to illegal markets is a significant problem.

Guns are diverted through theft, illegal sales and, in some instances, straw purchases.

We saw in the last few days, over 2,000 guns that were allegedly stolen recently. We've

also seen a number of high-profile incidents like the Danforth shooting, where the gun

that was used was from gang members and stolen in Saskatchewan.

Overall, many witnesses noted that we do not seem to have a good understanding of

patterns and trends in relation to the origins of illegal firearms in Canada. This gap was

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Stephen White, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized Policing Services, Royal

Canadian Mounted Police).

Ibid., (Brian Sauvé, President, National Police Federation). As noted in Statistics Canada brief, Ontario has its

own Firearms Tracing and Enforcement Centre. SECU, Brief, Statistics Canada, 10 February 2022.

SECU, Evidence, 17 February 2022 (Christian Pearce, Criminal Defence Counsel, Author, As an Individual).

Ibid.

SECU, Evidence, 15 February 2022 (Wendy Cukier, President, Coalition for Gun Control).

brought to the Committee’s attention by several witnesses, including Statistics Canada,

which noted in its brief that “there is currently little information publicly available which

indicates origin of firearms used in crime to determine whether a firearm used in a

crime was stolen, illegally purchased or smuggled into the country.”

In the words of RCMP Deputy Commissioner Stephen White, “we would need to do

more tracing on a larger scale to really get some very good insight of patterns and

trends.”

The benefits associated with tracing firearms are significant for the fight

against gun and gang violence. Tracing “can assist in identifying the suspect in a crime

and the criminal sourcing of that gun and any trafficking networks.”

It can link

apparently unrelated shootings and provide tactical intelligence to support targeted

police operations aimed at curbing gun smuggling and gun violence.

As noted by RCMP

Commissioner Brenda Lucki, firearm tracing

[…] is the key tool in determining the sources of and the diversion routes for the illegal

firearms, as well as the link between the criminal use of firearms and specific vendors,

and to identify the tracking routes and patterns.

During the study, many witnesses recommended improving the tracing of firearms

recovered at crime scenes.

Mandating law enforcement across the country to submit

the firearms they seized for tracing would be a best practice, according to the President

of the National Police Federation.

To conclude this section, the Committee was pleased to hear that the RCMP is working

to increase firearms tracing in order to obtain a “more comprehensive intelligence

picture.”

In the 2021 federal budget, the RCMP was provided with an investment of

$15 million over five years to increase its “capacity to trace firearms and identify the

SECU, Brief, Statistics Canada, 10 February 2022.

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Stephen White, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized Policing Services, Royal

Canadian Mounted Police).

SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Evan Bray, Chief of Police, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police).

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Stephen White, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized Policing Services, Royal

Canadian Mounted Police).

SECU, Evidence, 16 December 2021 (Brenda Lucki, Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police).

SECU, Evidence, 3 February 2022 (Maurice Sabourin, President, Winnipeg Police Association); SECU,

Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Myron Demkiw, Deputy Chief, Toronto Police Service); (Evan Bray, Chief of

Police, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police).

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Brian Sauvé, President, National Police Federation).

SECU, Evidence, 16 December 2021 (Stephen White, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized Policing Services,

Royal Canadian Mounted Police).

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

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movement of illegal firearms into and within Canada.”

This investment is expected to

triple the capacity of the RCMP to trace firearms.

2.5 The Involvement of Gangs in Gun Violence and the Trafficking of

Drugs and Firearms

The Committee was told repeatedly throughout the study that gun and gang violence

are issues that are deeply interconnected with the trafficking of drugs and firearms.

RCMP Deputy Commissioner Stephen White explained:

Our intelligence and investigative work clearly indicate that one of the primary activities

of street gangs is drug trafficking. In recent CISC work looking at street gangs, the

estimate was that over 400 street gangs are operating in Canada. The vast majority of

them use violence to further their criminal activities. A lot of their activities are very

high visibility crimes, I'd say, like shootings. Some of their main activities are drug

trafficking. It branches out as well to human trafficking and sex trade offences.

[…]

With the drug trafficking environment goes the use of firearms by organized crime

groups or by gangs somewhat recruited by organized crime groups to assist with street-

level distribution and street-level trafficking of drugs.

This connection between drug trafficking and gun and gang violence was clearly

illustrated by several witnesses, including Mitch Bourbonniere from Ogijiita Pimatiswin

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Stephen White, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized Policing Services, Royal

Canadian Mounted Police).

SECU, Evidence, 1 March 2022 (Brenda Lucki, Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police).

For example, see SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Evan Bray, Chief of Police, Canadian Association of

Chiefs of Police); (Dale McFee, Chief of Police, Edmonton Police Service); SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022

(Michael Spratt, Partner, Abergel Goldstein & Partners LLP, As an Individual); (Michael Rowe, Staff Sergeant,

Vancouver Police Department); SECU, Evidence, 17 February 2022 (David Bertrand, Chief Inspector, Criminal

Investigative Services, Service de police de la Ville de Montréal). Of note, in a brief submitted to the

Committee, the National Coalition Against Contraband Tobacco states that acting against the flow of

contraband tobacco is “a key component of tackling gun crime and illicit gun trafficking”, noting that

“approximately 175 organized crime groups [are] involved in the illicit tobacco trade, who make millions of

dollars daily from contraband tobacco. They use these proceeds of crime to fund other illicit activities, such

as the sale and distribution of guns, cocaine, illegal, unregulated, cannabis and fentanyl as well as human

trafficking.” See, SECU, Brief, National Coalition Against Contraband Tobacco, March 2022.

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Stephen White, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized Policing Services, Royal

Canadian Mounted Police).

Kinamatawin, who stated that “[g]uns are needed to carry out the drug trade.”

They

are needed for protection, intimidation, to deal with “failure of payment, hostile

takeovers, retribution, payback and retaliation.”

In the words of Chief Inspector David

Bertrand, Criminal Investigative Services, SPVM:

[…] there is still a connection between drug trafficking and firearms possession or

trafficking. We must remember that the more money or drugs people have, the more

protection they need. We've been seeing this recently with drug theft. People want to

protect themselves, they don't want to be attacked, so they carry guns. People also use

guns for intimidation and to protect their territory, of course.

As I was also saying, you must remember that they use the same routes.

RCMP Deputy Commissioner Stephen White noted that there are huge markets in

Canada for fentanyl and methamphetamine, as well as cocaine, “which has always been

more of a staple for organized crime groups in terms of drug importation and

distribution in Canada.”

The drug patterns may have changed in some part of the

country,

but as Deputy Commissioner White explained:

[W]hatever the drug is—whether it’s cocaine, fentanyl, or meth—if the demand is there,

you are going to get groups that are moving into it, both gangs and organized crime.

With that comes competition between gangs and organized crime, and that does foster

a potential increase in violence.

Similarly, Staff Sergeant Michael Rowe from the Vancouver Police Department noted

the following:

SECU, Evidence, 3 February 2022 (Mitch Bourbonniere, Outreach Worker, Ogijiita Pimatiswin Kinamatawin,

As an Individual).

Ibid.

SECU, Evidence, 17 February 2022 (David Bertrand, Chief Inspector, Criminal Investigative Services, Service

de police de la Ville de Montréal).

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Stephen White, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized Policing Services, Royal

Canadian Mounted Police).

For example, the Committee was informed that the drug patterns in the Edmonton area have changed in

recent years. In 2007 up to 2014, the main drug was cocaine, but today, “the most often recognized is

meth”. SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Dale McFee, Chief of Police, Edmonton Police Service).

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Stephen White, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized Policing Services, Royal

Canadian Mounted Police).

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

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It’s my belief that where there are significant opportunities to make a profit, that's also

where you see the violence increase as well, as people compete for that market. I do

believe there is a direct link.

In other words, “that lucrative drug market typically invites conflict that will then result

in gang violence.”

According to Chief Evan Bray from the Canadian Association of Chiefs

of Police:

[W]e can't overstate the importance of seeing the correlation between drugs and drug-

related activity and firearms. They are intertwined. People are committing offences

because they're involved in the drug world. The drug world drives a lot of violent

firearms-related crime in our country. People committing the crimes often have a

serious addiction problem, which obviously just perpetuates this and causes it to

continue to be a problem in the country.

Considering that drugs and gun violence are so intertwined, several witnesses expressed

views regarding how best to address the issue of substance abuse and drug violence.

Since substance abuse is a recognized underlying cause of gun violence, these

arguments will be discussed in the next chapter.

The Committee learned early on that national data on street gangs and their criminal

activities are very limited. Robert Henry, Assistant Professor, Department of Indigenous

Studies, University of Saskatchewan, contended that “we actually know very little about

street gangs because of the ambiguity of the term itself. A street gang in one community

is not a street gang in another.”

Based on Statistics Canada police-reported data in 2020, only “6% [of] firearm-related

violent crime was identified by police as confirmed or suspected to be committed by,

and for the benefit of, a criminal organization or street gang.”

As noted in its brief:

Although police report and sign off on these data, there are likely still challenges in

reporting accurately whether or not the incident was committed by or for the benefit of

organized crime, therefore this is likely an undercount.

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Michael Rowe, Staff Sergeant, Vancouver Police Department).

Ibid.

SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Evan Bray, Chief of Police, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police).

Ibid., (Robert Henry, Assistant Professor, Department of Indigenous Studies, University of Saskatchewan, As

an Individual).

SECU, Brief, Statistics Canada, 10 February 2022.

Ibid.

Police-reported data specific to homicides reveal that “[g]angs were involved in 39% of

homicides involving firearms in 2020.”

This was the lowest proportion recorded

since 2015.

As noted by Jeff Latimer from Statistics Canada, “firearms are used in the

vast majority of gang-related homicides, and most often it is a handgun.”

2.6 Trends Observed in Major Urban Centres Regarding Gun and

Gang Violence

Recognizing the limitations of the national data on gun and gang violence and that some

communities are experiencing higher occurrences of such violence, the Committee felt it

was important to allude to specific tendencies related to the increase in gun and gang

violence observed in those communities. The following sections briefly address some

trends observed by local law enforcement agencies operating in major urban centres

across the country.

2.6.1 Surge of Gun Violence in Public Spaces

As previously noted, many Canadian cities have experienced spikes in gun violence in

recent years. Often, shootings are occurring in public spaces, threatening numerous

innocent individuals. In certain parts of the country, gun violence is a daily occurrence.

According to the President of the Winnipeg Police Association, Maurice Sabourin, this is

the case in Winnipeg, which is “arguably one of the most violent jurisdictions in the

country.”

In Toronto, a 20% increase in the number of homicides was recorded in 2021,

including 46 shooting homicides. In Edmonton, 150 shootings were recorded that year.

Likewise, the increase in gun violence observed in Montreal in recent years is striking.

Chief Inspector David Bertrand from the SPVM informed the Committee that

129 criminal incidents where a firearm was discharged were recorded in 2021,

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Jeff Latimer, Director General, Health, Justice, Diversity and Populations,

Statistics Canada).

Ibid.

SECU, Evidence, 3 February 2022 (Maurice Sabourin, President, Winnipeg Police Association).

SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Evan Bray, Chief of Police, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police); (Dale

McFee, Chief of Police, Edmonton Police Service).

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

AND GANG VIOLENCE IN CANADA

compared to 89 in 2020, and 32 in 2019.

With respect to firearm-related homicides, he

informed the Committee that the number “increased from five in 2020 to 19 in 2021”.

In his testimony, Toronto Police Service Deputy Chief Myron Demkiw spoke about the

threat to public safety fuelled by the rise in gun violence in Toronto and the proliferation

of illegal firearms:

When it comes to the gun violence the city’s experiencing, I can tell you that we are

seeing more guns being fired and the discharge of firearms in public spaces, not in

people’s homes and not in confined spaces. It’s difficult to draw a clear line between

what is a gang shooting and what is a shooting that’s drug related or related to

protection of turf or illicit business. We know we have a serious issue with respect to the

proliferation of firearms among persons who are not readily known to be gang members

or associated to gangs.

2.6.2 More Shots Being Fired During Shootings

Staff Sergeant Michael Rowe explained that the Vancouver Police Department is noticing

more shots being fired when gun violence is occurring in the city, which could be

explained by gang members having easy access to ammunition and high-capacity

magazines, as well as fully automatic firearms:

Even recently, we had a drive-by shooting of a residence. We noted that over 10 shots

were fired in a very short period of time. I believe this is definitely a reflection of the

access to more ammunition and high-capacity magazines. It can also be a reflection of

the proliferation of fully automatic firearms as well.

Similarly, Deputy Chief Myron Demkiw from the Toronto Police Service reported a

significant increase in shell casings seized at crime scenes in the city of Toronto:

The number of shell casings seized at shootings has risen significantly in 2021. We have

seized 2,405 shell casings at crime scenes, representing a 48% increase over the

previous year.

[…]

SECU, Evidence, 17 February 2022 (David Bertrand, Chief Inspector, Criminal Investigative Services, Service

de police de la Ville de Montréal).

Ibid.

SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Myron Demkiw, Deputy Chief, Toronto Police Service).

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Michael Rowe, Staff Sergeant, Vancouver Police Department).

each of those shell casings represents a projectile that flew in our city.

2.6.3 Greater Involvement of Young Persons in Gun Violence

Deputy Chief Myron Demkiw from the Toronto Police Service and Fady Dagher, Director

of the Service de police de l’agglomération de Longueuil (SPAL), informed the Committee

that they are seeing younger persons becoming involved in gun violence. Deputy Chief

Demkiw was particularly concerned about their greater involvement in shootings

in Toronto:

There is increasing concern over the involvement of younger persons in shootings and

the risk that our youth face from gun violence in Toronto. In 2021, the average age of

persons involved in shootings, either as an accused or suspect, or as a person of

interest, dropped from 25 years of age to 20 years of age.

Similar observations were made by Director Fady Dagher from the SPAL, who also noted

that youth are increasingly using guns for protection:

What we're increasingly seeing, on the one hand, is youth arming themselves because

they're afraid. On the other hand, you have young people who are being paid by

organized crime to engage in actual shooting.

2.6.4 Greater Accessibility of Illegal Firearms and a General Sense of

Impunity Among Youth and Gang Members

Like Toronto, Montreal seems to be experiencing a proliferation of firearms in the hands

of gang members and criminals. Chief Inspector David Bertrand from the SPVM noted

the increased accessibility of illegal firearms on the streets of Montreal and a general

sense of impunity among youth and gang members in relation to being seen with

firearms. It seems like the gun culture is now more valued than ever among gang

members who are using social media to exhibit their lifestyles and challenge their

opponents. As Chief Inspector David Bertrand explained:

We have made several observations. Illegal firearms have become more accessible in

recent years in particular. Even gun dealers sometimes do business in public, in broad

daylight. We've also noted a stronger presence of firearms among youth. There is a

sense of impunity, a strong gun culture, an all of these factors partly explain this gun

SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Myron Demkiw, Deputy Chief, Toronto Police Service).

Ibid.

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Fady Dagher, Director, Service de police de l’agglomération de

Longueuil).

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

AND GANG VIOLENCE IN CANADA

craze emphasis on gun possession. Finally, shows of force are prized and advocated

within crime groups. In short, [sic] and the increase we've seen in violent events

involving firearms.

We also need to adapt to new realities, which include crime groups using social media

to flaunt their lifestyle and challenge their opponents. It's important to focus on

this usage.

[…]

people no longer fear being seen with guns on social media or walking around

with guns.

We are more and more regularly seeing people with crime backgrounds starting over

and making a show of force on social media. We've had investigations into videos where

six, seven, eight guns were on display and ultimately the investigation found that they

were real guns. Obviously, there is a prevailing sense of impunity because people are no

longer afraid to be seen with firearms.

In the past, when a crime was committed, the perpetrator would leave the gun at the

scene. Remember, that was what people did in recent years. Why did they do it? To

avoid being caught with the weapon after the crime was committed. Now what we are

seeing more and more is people are not leaving the gun at the scene of the crime. The

fear or dread of being caught with the gun after a crime is no longer there.

We also see it when we stop vehicles. Back then, this is a few years ago, when criminals

were stopped, we would often find a single firearm inside the vehicle; now we often

find two or three.

Similar observations regarding crime guns being treated as a commodity were made by

Detective Philip Neyron from the Winnipeg Police Association:

They're almost cleaning their guns and cleaning things that have been used in a crime. A

gun is a commodity; instead of throwing it in the river or hiding it, they are selling it,

making a profit. Illegal gun prices have at least doubled, especially handguns with

ammunition. They ship them to different parts of the country where they make a

profit.

Finally, as previously noted, several police services spoke about the increased presence

of ghost guns and high-capacity magazines on the illegal market. Staff Sergeant Michael

Rowe from the Vancouver Police Department described these troubling trends:

SECU, Evidence, 17 February 2022 (David Bertrand, Chief Inspector, Criminal Investigative Services, Service

de police de la Ville de Montréal).

SECU, Evidence, 3 February 2022 (Philip Neyron, Detective, Winnipeg Police Association).

Modern 3-D printing materials can produce a durable firearm, capable of shooting

hundreds of rounds without a failure. For example, one of my teams recently completed

an investigation in which we executed search warrants on a residential home. Inside this

home, we located a sophisticated firearms manufacturing operation capable of

producing 3-D printed firearms. They had firearm suppressors and they were completing

airsoft conversions—converting airsoft pistols into fully functioning firearms.

Another trend we're dealing with is the use of high-capacity magazines. Magazines are

modified to accept more than the lawfully allowed five rounds of ammunition. These

magazines allow for more shots to be fired without the user having to pause to reload.

High-capacity magazines can be manufactured by altering lawfully purchased

magazines, but also through 3-D printing.

2.7 Addressing the Urgent Need for Better Data and Intelligence

Regarding Gun and Gang Violence in Canada: Recommendations

of the Committee

As illustrated in this chapter, there are considerable limitations regarding data collection

on gun and gang violence in Canada, notably regarding firearms tracing. Given that

access to reliable data and intelligence is crucial for informing policy, allocating resources

and disrupting the activities of individuals and groups involved in gun violence and

trafficking, the Committee recommends:

Recommendation 1

That the Government of Canada create and fund an interdisciplinary National Centre of

Excellence dedicated to collecting Canadian specific data and conducting research on

firearms violence.

Recommendation 2

That the Government of Canada provide additional resources to Statistics Canada and

law enforcement agencies to ensure consistency in the collection of data related to

firearms smuggling, the use of firearms in the commission of a crime, and the use of

firearms in gang-related crime.

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Michael Rowe, Staff Sergeant, Vancouver Police Department).

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

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Recommendation 3

That the Government of Canada update the federal firearms program to require police

agencies to submit for tracing firearms that were acquired by police in relation to

criminal activity or sent in for destruction.

Recommendation 4

That the Government of Canada create uniform standards for tracing firearms involved

in the commission of a crime, and that police services be adequately resourced in order

to enhance tracing capabilities.

Recommendation 5

That the Government of Canada mandate the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to

implement effective ongoing training for Royal Canadian Mounted Police officers to close

gaps within current Canadian National Firearms Tracing Centre’s efforts.

Recommendation 6

That the Government of Canada increase funding for the Canadian Criminal Intelligence

Service to enable comprehensive intelligence sharing across all police services in Canada

to improve their effectiveness in tracing firearms and combatting organized and gang-

related crime.

CHAPTER 3—ROOT CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF GUN AND GANG

VIOLENCE

The Committee heard compelling evidence about the need to address the underlying

causes of gun and gang violence, prevent youth from joining gangs, and assist individuals

involved in gang activities to exit this lifestyle. While witnesses stressed repeatedly that

there is no one solution that will eradicate gun violence, all agreed that addressing the

root causes of violence is a critical component of any strategy put forward to effectively

reduce its occurrence.

This chapter discusses the factors that make some individuals more vulnerable to engage

in gang activities and gun violence, the features of gang culture related to violence and

recruitment and, more importantly, what needs to be done to prevent youth and young

adults from joining gangs in the first place.

3.1 Root Causes of Gun and Gang Violence

The underlying causes of gun and gang violence are varied, complex and interrelated,

especially as regards Indigenous people. During the Committee’s study, poverty,

inequality, Indigeneity, racism, mental illness, social isolation, substance abuse, extremist

ideologies,

access to affordable housing, education and health were presented as risk

For example, see SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Stephen White, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized

Policing Services, Royal Canadian Mounted Police); SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Myron Demkiw,

Deputy Chief, Toronto Police Service); (Evan Bray, Chief of Police, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police);

(Caillin Langmann, Assistant Clinical Professor, Department of Medicine, McMaster University, As an

Individual); SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Solomon Friedman, Criminal Defence Lawyer, As an

Individual); SECU, Evidence, 15 February 2022 (Wendy Cukier, President, Coalition for Gun Control); (Marcell

Wilson, Founder, One By One Movement Inc.); (Evelyn Fox, Founder, Communities for Zero Violence). SECU,

Evidence, 17 February 2022 (Keith Loh, President, Port Coquitlam & District Hunting & Fishing Club);

Matthew Hipwell (President, Wolverine Supplies); SECU, Evidence, 1 March 2022 (Hon. Marco Mendicino,

Minister of Public Safety).

The National Police Federation reminded the Committee that “[m]ental health issues and extremist

ideologies have led multiple perpetrators to gun violence.” SECU, Brief, National Police Federation, February

2022, p. 5.

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

AND GANG VIOLENCE IN CANADA

factors rendering some individuals more susceptible to engage in gun and

gang violence.

Based on his experience as a criminal defence lawyer, Michael Spratt shared with the

Committee that almost all the individuals he has represented for firearm-related

offences were either racialized, suffering from addiction or mental health problems, or

living in poverty.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, many witnesses who participated in this study were very

concerned that “[p]eople committing the crimes often have a serious addiction problem,

which obviously just perpetuates this and causes it to continue to be a problem in the

country.”

This can be a vicious cycle, as Professor Robert Henry explained:

Violence creates trauma. Trauma without proper supports moves people to find

alternatives to deal with the trauma. This then moves to substance misuse, with

substances used to numb the trauma and pain.

In view of this vicious cycle, several witnesses held that prevention of gun and gang

violence requires “[getting] to the root issues […] as they relate to why people are

addicted.”

It was recognized that simply imprisoning a person with a drug addiction

will likely not solve the problem of gun and gang violence: what they need is support

and treatment.

In the opinion of criminal defence lawyer Michael Spratt, considering

that drug and gun violence are so intertwined, legalizing drugs and providing safe supply

to people using drugs would save lives:

For example, see SECU, Brief, Canadian Doctors for Protection from Guns, 27 February 2022; SECU,

Evidence, 15 February 2022 (Wendy Cukier, President, Coalition for Gun Control); (Evelyn Fox, Founder,

Communities for Zero Violence); SECU, Evidence, 3 February 2022 (Nicole Whiskeyjack, Community

Coordinator, Native Counselling Services of Alberta); For example, see SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022

(Robert Henry, Assistant Professor, Department of Indigenous Studies, University of Saskatchewan, As an

Individual); (Evan Bray, Chief of Police, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police); (Myron Demkiw, Deputy

Chief, Toronto Police Service); SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Robert Henry, Assistant Professor,

Department of Indigenous Studies, University of Saskatchewan, As an Individual); SECU, Evidence, 15

February 2022 (Evelyn Fox, Founder, Communities for Zero Violence); SECU, Evidence, 16 December (Hon.

Marco Mendicino, Public Safety Minister).

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Michael Spratt, Partner, Abergel Goldstein & Partners LLP, As an

Individual).

SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Evan Bray, Chief of Police, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police).

Ibid., (Robert Henry, Assistant Professor, Department of Indigenous Studies, University of Saskatchewan, As

an Individual).

Ibid., (Myron Demkiw, Deputy Chief, Toronto Police Service).

SECU, Evidence, 1 March 2022 (Hon. Marco Mendicino, Minister of Public Safety).

Real solutions are more complex […] One of the big solutions is changing how we deal

with drug laws in Canada. Almost all of the firearms offences that I’ve seen are

connected in some way to drug crimes. It’s the system of drug enforcement and

prosecution that we have in Canada, making narcotics illegal, that fuels the use of guns.

Guns follow profit. A system of legalization and safe supply would cure many ills, and

one of them is that it would help with gun offences.

100

The Committee also heard that children and youth in the child welfare system are more

at risk of engaging in and being recruited by gangs, especially Indigenous children, who

are overrepresented in the child welfare system when compared to their proportion of

the general population. As explained by Professor Robert Henry:

When we look at individuals engaged in street gangs, especially with Indigenous people,

we see very high rates of individuals who have been multiply placed within child welfare

systems. A lot of individuals say that was their first taste of understanding

institutionalization. That’s where they started building their relationships, going through

there with like-minded individuals.

101

Addressing the issue of Indigenous children more specifically, Marlene Orr, Chief

Executive Officer, Native Counselling Services of Alberta, stated that “[i]nvolvement in

child welfare systems that separate families, punish children and parents for historic

trauma behaviours […] leads youth directly from foster care to the prison system.”

102

Indeed, the overrepresentation of Indigenous people in Canadian prisons is well

documented.

103

In his testimony, the Minister of Public Safety spoke about how

overrepresentation of Indigenous and racialized people in correctional facilities is related

to the root causes of gun violence:

I think looking at some of the root causes of gun violence and violence writ large across

the country does mean confronting systemic challenges within our institutions,

including within the criminal justice system. We see far too much overrepresentation of

Indigenous and racialized people in our jails. That is a problem that we need

to address.

104

100

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Michael Spratt, Partner, Abergel Goldstein & Partners LLP, As an

Individual).

101

SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Robert Henry, Assistant Professor, Department of Indigenous Studies,

University of Saskatchewan, As an Individual).

102

SECU, Evidence, 3 February 2022 (Marlene Orr, Chief Executive Officer, Native Counselling Services

of Alberta).

103

See various annual reports and special reports published by the Office of the Correctional Investigator

of Canada.

104

SECU, Evidence, 16 December 2021 (Hon. Marco Mendicino, Public Safety Minister).

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Throughout the study, many witnesses reminded the Committee of the

intergenerational trauma resulting from the mass removal of Indigenous children from

their families by child protection services in the 1960s. They stressed that the legacy of

residential schools continues to be felt today by the Indigenous population, who are

confronted with higher rates of poverty, lack of housing and poor living conditions, poor

mental and physical health, high rates of substance use, limited access to services and

programs, racism, and, as noted above, overrepresentation in the child welfare system

and the criminal justice system.

105

All these social and historical factors are making Indigenous youth more vulnerable to

becoming involved with gangs. Marlene Orr from the Native Counselling Services of

Alberta spoke about how the historical trauma feeds into gang activity:

The means by which Indian residential school survivors parented children are directly

related to how they were conditioned with violence and abuse in the schools. Prior to

Indian residential school involvement, parenting and raising children involved many

others in the community, who taught the values embedded in natural law: the values of

kindness, respect, humility, sharing and self-determination. Indian residential school

replaced the nurturing of community with control, violence, abuse, identity shame and

loss of connection to family, community and nation. Survivors of Indian residential

school parented their children in the only way they were taught—with violence and

abuse.

This intergenerational violence, combined with other colonial impacts like community

poverty, loss of cultural identity, blatant racism and the lack of opportunity for

education and employment, has left Indigenous youth powerless and hopeless.

106

As explained by Nicole Whiskeyjack, Community Coordinator, Native Counselling

Services of Alberta, a former gang member recruited when she was 18 and very

vulnerable, “[o]ftentimes, people who are living on the streets in that kind of life, that’s

why they get caught up with gangs and violence and drugs because a lot of times, that’s

their safe way out.”

107

The legacy of residential schools also impacted the relationship many Indigenous people

have with police services. Nicole Whiskeyjack said that many Indigenous children still

105

For example, see SECU, Evidence, 3 February 2022 (Marlene Orr, Chief Executive Officer, Native Counselling

Services of Alberta); (Nicole Whiskeyjack, Community Coordinator, Native Counselling Services of Alberta);

SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Robert Henry, Assistant Professor, Department of Indigenous Studies,

University of Saskatchewan, As an Individual).

106

SECU, Evidence, 3 February 2022 (Marlene Orr, Chief Executive Officer, Native Counselling Services of

Alberta).

107

Ibid., (Nicole Whiskeyjack, Community Coordinator, Native Counselling Services of Alberta).

mistrust police services because “[t]hey know that the police service came and took

their parents away, took them to a residential school. They never saw them again. It’s all

of that stuff.”

108

Witnesses reminded the Committee that the experience of Indigenous

people with different services, including school, health care, child welfare and the justice

system, is too often shaped by racial stereotypes, whether intentional or not. Nicole

Whiskeyjack further explained that “those children have had a lot of traumas in their

lives, historical trauma, and nobody has ever been there to help them deal with it or to

give them the tools they need to deal with it.”

109

3.2 Understanding the Violence in Gang Culture

3.2.1 Gangs Prey on Vulnerabilities

Several witnesses emphasized that gangs prey on vulnerabilities to recruit new

members. When Indigenous youth are struggling with poverty, racism and trauma, they

often become disconnected and feel oppressed, which can make them vulnerable to

joining gangs. As noted by Marlene Orr:

Gangs prey on this and they exploit trauma-based behaviours like alcohol and drug

addiction, as well as exploiting the deep longing for cultural identity and a place to

belong. Gangs take concepts of historical identity, like warriors, and twist them to their

advantage.

110

Similarly, Nicole Whiskeyjack, who shared with the Committee her experience regarding

her struggles when she was recruited by a gang at the age of 18, described the cycle of

violence operating within gang culture:

Then these gangs come in, and pick these kids up, and build those relationships with

them and then they make them feel safe and then guns come into play. We will give you

this gun. This is your protection. Then they feel safe, they have a relationship and they

have protection. Most of the time that’s what Indigenous children want is a relationship,

protection and trust, somebody they can trust and build a relationship with.

111

One of the issues identified during the study was the recruitment of Indigenous youth in

prisons. The Committee learned that Indigenous youth are often forced to become

108

Ibid.

109

Ibid.

110

Ibid., (Marlene Orr, Chief Executive Officer, Native Counselling Services of Alberta).

111

Ibid., (Nicole Whiskeyjack, Community Coordinator, Native Counselling Services of Alberta).

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involved with gangs for their own protection within the correctional institution. It was

explained to the Committee that

[i]n the Prairies, Indigenous gangs control the institutions. Even gang members with

international links and [sic] might know that their status doesn’t get them protection in

federal institutions in Canada. Paying Indigenous gangs to protect them is a usual

practice. The overrepresentation of Indigenous people in justice and corrections has

resulted in a lot of power being centralized in the hands of Indigenous gangs in the

institutions. The power of sheer numbers of Indigenous gang members means strength

in the institutions, so as we continue with high incarceration rates of Indigenous people,

we are contributing to the gang problems in this country.

Young Indigenous offenders serving their first federal sentence in penitentiaries are

vulnerable to the pressure. They are targeted for membership and are taught how to be

more violent and more dangerous. They’re taught to expand their criminal skills during

incarceration.

112

3.2.2 The Concept of Hypermasculinity

During the study, the concept of hypermasculinity was presented as a focal point in

understanding gang culture. As Professor Robert Henry explained, hypermasculinity is a

factor both in prompting gang members to violence and preventing them from reaching

out for help and support:

Why is violence used, and how does it escalate to a point where firearms and shootings

become necessary and normalized within different spaces? Through my research as well

as research conducted internationally, we see that masculinity becomes a focal point. A

hypermasculine performance is promoted within the street, and challenges to their

face, status, respect or power become a primary reason that an individual may act out

with specific violence and a hyperviolence that leads to an increase in gun violence.

We also have to understand, however, that the violence is framed within localized street

codes and street justice. These codes then frame how violence is used and the level of

violence that needs to be used to protect oneself, or protect one’s face, if you will.

Again, because of the connection to masculinity, going to the police, whether to help or

support individuals, is actually problematic. They’re not going to go to them for help, as

they will be labelled as unable to look after themselves, which actually increases their

victimization for later in life.

113

112

Ibid., (Marlene Orr, Chief Executive Officer, Native Counselling Services of Alberta).

113

SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Robert Henry, Assistant Professor, Department of Indigenous Studies,

University of Saskatchewan, As an Individual).

3.3 Youth Interventions and Diversion Programs

The Committee heard repeatedly that programs focussing on diverting young people

from gang culture are critical to tackling the issue of gun and gang violence. Professor

Caillin Langmann from the Department of Medicine of McMaster University stated the

following when he was asked what the focus should be regarding investments in the

prevention of gun violence going forward:

The best focus would be to spend this money on deterrents and reduction in the level of

gang violence by reducing the number of youth who are starting to get involved in gang

activity by comprehensive methods like Operation Ceasefire

114

and other programs, like

the comprehensive gang strategy and Wraparound Milwaukee.

115

Throughout the study, the Committee heard about the significant benefits provided by

programs and initiatives aimed at encouraging vulnerable youth to participate in positive

activities and preventing them from joining gangs. These benefits are demonstrated not

only by the successes shared with the Committee by the people involved in those

programs and initiatives but also by research. As explained by Professor Caillin

Langmann in his brief:

A research report by Public Safety Canada 2012, gathered evidence from a number of

programs operating in Canada to reduce youth gang participation and demonstrated

beneficial effects in the ranges of 50% reduction in gang participation.

116

According to Professor Langmann, the most promising avenues for reducing gun and

gang violence entail gang deterrence, intervention and collaboration. He also noted that

“[s]ocial programs which reduce poverty, income inequality and unemployment rates

and provide a focus on education have also been shown to reduce firearms violence.”

117

Programs and initiatives providing support and services to vulnerable communities are

accordingly essential, especially in Indigenous communities, where access to programs

and services is lacking or highly underfunded.

114

Operation Ceasefire was launched in Boston. It involves reducing “the demand for weapons by targeting

gangs specifically in terms of warning and legal interventions as well as working with community groups and

workers to reduce youth membership in gangs.” SECU, Brief, Caillin Langmann, 8 February 2022, p. 8.

115

SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Caillin Langmann, Assistant Clinical Professor, Department of Medicine,

McMaster University, As an Individual).

116

SECU, Brief, Caillin Langmann, 8 February 2022.

117

Ibid.

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Several witnesses echoed Professor Langmann, stating that these promising initiatives

and programs are currently significantly underfunded and that to effectively reduce gun

and gang violence, additional investments to support them are required.

118

When youth are already engaged in gun and gang violence, the Committee was told that

youth diversion programs are key to prevent further involvement in criminal activities.

According to Professor Caillin Langmann:

If we want to target some of these issues, I would suggest diverting youth at an early

age, when we know they are starting to run into problems with the criminal justice

system, as well as when we find mothers who are reaching out for help, either in the

emergency department or in the community. When they have no support for their

children, when the children have no psychiatric support, it takes sometimes months for

a referral from me to a psychiatrist for these patients to be seen.

I would strongly recommend that you divert money towards psychiatric care as well as

some of these anti-gang initiatives.

119

Throughout the study, the Committee heard about several promising local prevention

initiatives and programs aimed at preventing youth from participating in gang activities,

offering support to individuals to exit gangs or fulfilling the unmet needs of vulnerable

communities. A number of these local initiatives involve people with lived experiences

who “understand how the streets work.”

120

The following examples of promising

initiatives operating in communities across the country were presented to

the Committee:

• The STR8 UP program was designed by two former gang members. Based

in Saskatoon, its mission is “to assist individuals in mastering their own

destiny and liberating themselves from gangs, addictions and criminal

street lifestyles.”

121

• The non-profit organization Keep6ix has developed, among other

initiatives, a program called “Gangs 4 Tuition,” which “gives individuals an

opportunity to trade gang lifestyles for education in skilled trade and the

118

SECU, Evidence, 3 February 2022 (Kevin Walker, Interim Executive Director, Bear Clan Patrol Inc.).

119

SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Caillin Langmann, Assistant Clinical Professor, Department of Medicine,

McMaster University, As an Individual).

120

SECU, Evidence, 15 February 2022 (Marcell Wilson, Founder, One By One Movement Inc.).

121

SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Stan Tu’Inukuafe, Co-Founder, STR8 UP: 10,000 Little Steps to Healing

Inc.).

tech sector by means of mentorship and expert-delivered training

programs, along with life coaching.”

122

• In Manitoba, Ogibjiita Pimatiswin Kinamatawin offers support to

marginalized, at-risk Indigenous young adults and their families. It

operates, among other services, a gang diversion program in Winnipeg

that attempts to prevent youth from joining gangs in the first place and

provide support to gang members to exit gang life.

123

• Bear Clan Patrol Inc. was created in 1992 in the North End of Winnipeg. It

is now present throughout Canada. Its “mission is to provide a constant

visible presence on the street addressing the conflict with non-violent

interventions, promoting and providing safety, empowering our women,

youth, elders and vulnerable sectors of our community.”

124

Many

initiatives are supported under this program, such as a food security

program and female-led youth patrols.

• One By One Movement Inc. was founded by former gang, extremist and

organized crime members to help identify and research effective social

programming for youth outreach. Its primary goal is operating as a think

tank to assist organizations with the implementation of effective

strategies to prevent extreme acts of violence.

125

• Communities for Zero Violence was founded by a mother who lost her

son to gun violence. It provides “peer-led supports for homicide survivors

and victims of community violence, as a way to interrupt the cycle.”

126

• The ILAUNCH program, which stands for “linking actions for unmet needs

in children’s health,” is a community-based program supporting

Indigenous families and youth, providing them with the tools and

122

SECU, Evidence, 15 February 2022 (Richard Miller, Founder, Keep6ix).

123

SECU, Evidence, 3 February 2022 (Mitch Bourbonniere, Outreach Worker, Ogijiita Pimatiswin Kinamatawin,

As an Individual).

124

Ibid., (Kevin Walker, Interim Executive Director, Bear Clan Patrol Inc.).

125

SECU, Evidence, 15 February 2022 (Marcell Wilson, Founder, One By One Movement Inc.).

126

Ibid., (Evelyn Fox, Founder, Communities for Zero Violence).

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resources they need to get the help they need and advocating

for them.

127

• Liberty for Youth offers several prevention and intervention programs to

disadvantaged, marginalized and at-risk youth and young adults in

Hamilton, including various sports and musical programs, education

assistance and tutoring.”

128

3.4 Preventing Gun and Gang Violence and Youth and Young Adults

from Participating in Gangs: Recommendations of the

Committee

It is clear from the testimony and documentation received during the study that to

effectively deter individuals from engaging in gun and gang violence, we as a society,

must address the root causes of such violence. The majority of witnesses stressed that

greater attention and resources must be provided to support community-based

intervention and prevention programs aimed at reducing gun and gang violence.

Greater investment must also be made in Indigenous communities so they can address

historical trauma. Grand Chief Abram Benedict of the Mohawk Council of Akwesasne

said that the government must “promote economic development, partner and create

more jobs,” as he argued that sometimes criminal activity is a response to the lack of

opportunities: “When there are fewer opportunities, that means they are looking for

ways to support themselves that are outside of social supports.”

129

Several witnesses also recognized that tackling these issues will require a whole-of-

society approach.

130

As Deputy Chief Myron Demkiw from the Toronto Police Service

stated, ensuring the safety of our communities is a shared responsibility that “requires

127

SECU, Evidence, 3 February 2022 (Nicole Whiskeyjack, Community Coordinator, Native Counselling Services

of Alberta).

128

SECU, Brief, Liberty for Youth, 22 March 2022.

129

SECU, Evidence, 3 February 2022 (Abram Benedict, Grand Chief, Mohawk Council of Akwesasne).

130

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Stephen White, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized Policing Services, Royal

Canadian Mounted Police).

coordination and collaboration between all levels of government, the police,

communities and social services.”

131

In addition, the Committee heard that prevention programs and initiatives to address

the issue of gun violence and street gang activities must take the following into account:

• Programs must be tailored to communities’ needs and be culturally

adaptable.

132

• Early childhood, youth and young adult violence prevention initiatives are

needed to educate and raise awareness.

133

• Considering the realities often faced by youth involved in gang activities

(e.g., poor education, limited prospects for employment), meaningful

alternatives for youth at risk must be provided in each community

impacted by gun and gang violence.

134

• Exit strategies and community support must be available in all affected

communities across the country for people involved in gang activities.

135

• Organizations providing effective prevention programs must have access

to core funding.

136

• Since substance abuse is an important contributor to gun violence “we

[as a society] need to look at moving from punitive and criminal justice

131

SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Myron Demkiw, Deputy Chief, Toronto Police Service); SECU, Evidence,

1 February 2022 (Stephen White, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized Policing Services, Royal Canadian

Mounted Police).

132

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Stephen White, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized Policing Services, Royal

Canadian Mounted Police).

133

SECU, Evidence, 15 February 2022 (Marcell Wilson (Founder, One By One Movement Inc.); SECU, Evidence,

1 February 2022 (Stephen White, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized Policing Services, Royal Canadian

Mounted Police).

134

For example, see SECU, Evidence, 15 February 2022 (Richard Miller, Founder, Keep6ix).

135

For example, see SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Stephen White, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized

Policing Services, Royal Canadian Mounted Police); SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Evan Bray, Chief of

Police, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police).

136

SECU, Evidence, 3 February 2022 (Kevin Walker, Interim Executive Director, Bear Clan Patrol Inc.).

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

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approaches to more of a public health approach” to deal with this

problem.

137

• “Healing dollars for Indigenous people need to be directed to Indigenous

groups.”

138

• Considering the negative relationships with police services in some

communities – especially Indigenous communities – we [as a society]

need to build healthy relationships that are community led, not led by

police. “Rather, police need to come in as partners.”

139

In light of these considerations, the Committee recommends:

Recommendation 7

That the Government of Canada focus on diverting youth and young adults from gang

culture as an effective measure to prevent gun and gang violence and to prevent young

people from ending up in the justice system.

Recommendation 8

That the Government of Canada expand the National Crime Prevention Strategy to

provide streamlined and stable funding for community organizations delivering culturally

specific, key community social programs aimed at addressing the root causes of violence

involving youth and young adults, such as:

• gang diversion programs focused on youth and young adults,

particularly pre-gang involvement;

• gang diversion programs for Indigenous Peoples and racialized

Canadians;

137

SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Robert Henry, Assistant Professor, Department of Indigenous Studies,

University of Saskatchewan, As an Individual).

138

SECU, Evidence, 3 February 2022 (Marlene Orr, Chief Executive Officer, Native Counselling Services of

Alberta).

139

SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Robert Henry, Assistant Professor, Department of Indigenous Studies,

University of Saskatchewan, As an Individual).

• gang exit programs that incorporate the experience of former gang

members who can provide support and advice to individuals looking to

leave gang life;

• victim-led and trauma informed community services designed to

support families and communities recover from the violence of

shootings.

Recommendation 9

That the Government of Canada recognize Indigenous community organizations engaged

in gang diversion and community safety as policing services and fund these organizations

to work on mental health services, peacekeeping, security, accountability and youth

diversion in their respective communities.

Recommendation 10

That the Government of Canada host a National Gun and Gang Summit in Ottawa for

community organizations working on preventing youth and young adults from being

involved in gang activities and assisting those already involved to exit this lifestyle.

Furthermore, the Committee recognizes that drug addiction is an important contributor

to gun violence and must be treated as a public health issue. While gun violence and

drug trafficking are serious criminal offences that deserve rigorous enforcement of

current legislation, individuals struggling with addictions deserve treatment, not prison

or punishment. In light of these considerations, the Committee recommends:

Recommendation 11

That the Government of Canada recognize that serious crimes involving firearms and

drug trafficking should bear serious penalties given the threat to public safety, and that

violent offenders should be kept off our streets to protect the public, while a public

health response should be adopted to deal with people suffering from substance abuse.

Recommendation 12

That the Government of Canada:

• recognize that the high profitability of the illicit drug trade, which

contributes to the opioid epidemic in Canada, gives rise to gun and gang

violence, as well as the illicit tobacco trade;

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• recognize the need for greater funding for public education to reduce

stigma associated with substance abuse and addiction, treat trauma,

and expand access to treatment, and recovery services;

• study the role of harm reduction in preventing gun and gang violence;

and

• increase support to divert individuals suffering from addiction from

being involved in the criminal justice system in favour of rehabilitation.

Recommendation 13

That the Government of Canada decriminalize the simple possession of all illicit drugs as

called upon by the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police and public health officials, in

consultations with provincial authorities and other stakeholders, while not impeding law

enforcement’s ability to prosecute the trafficking of illicit drugs.

CHAPTER 4—LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND THE CRIMINAL

JUSTICE SYSTEM

Law enforcement agencies cannot combat gun and gang violence on their own. As

previously stated, tackling gun and gang violence requires concerted efforts by law

enforcement agencies and community stakeholders.

140

This chapter provides an overview of the activities of law enforcement agencies across

the country regarding gun and gang violence and discusses the key requirements

witnesses reported they need to improve their work, including appropriate funding;

stronger border control; enhanced collaboration, coordination and partnerships; and

adequately resourced prosecution services and appropriate sentencing.

4.1 Overview of the Roles and Responsabilities of Law Enforcement

Agencies

Across the country, law enforcement agencies, whether federal, provincial, municipal or

Indigenous, have complementary and equally important roles and responsibilities in

protecting our communities. Indeed, collaborative initiatives and partnerships between

these agencies are considered to be central to effectively deal with gun and gang

violence. This section of the report discusses their various roles and responsibilities.

4.1.1 Federal Law Enforcement Agencies

The RCMP has a wide mandate. It has policing jurisdiction across much of Canada,

“including all provinces except Ontario and Quebec, all territories, 155 municipalities

and approximately 600 Indigenous communities, as well as the contracted policing of

jurisdictions.”

141

The RCMP also provides specialized policing services to law

enforcement agencies across the country, for example, by supporting “the identification,

arrest and prosecution of criminals and criminal groups that seek to commit gun- and

gang-related crime.”

142

These specialized services are primarily provided through the

Canadian Firearms Program, the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada and the Forensic

Science and Identification Services.

140

For example, see SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Abram Benedict, Grand Chief, Mohawk Council of

Akwesasne).

141

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Stephen White, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized Policing Services, Royal

Canadian Mounted Police).

142

Ibid.

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AND GANG VIOLENCE IN CANADA

While the RCMP’s mandate focuses on gun and gang violence and gun smuggling and

trafficking between the ports of entry in Canada, the Canada Border Services Agency

(CBSA) has the mandate of ensuring compliance with existing laws and therefore plays

an important role in the detection of firearms at the border. To carry out its mandate,

the CBSA focuses on collaboration and partnerships with various law enforcement

agencies in Canada and abroad, and its “firearms strategy focuses on identifying criminal

networks and trafficking routes in order to prevent illicit firearms from crossing the

border, and to disrupt the smuggling done by criminal networks.”

143

4.1.2 Provincial and Municipal Police Services

During the study, the Committee heard from various provincial and municipal police

services that are currently working to curb gun and gang violence within their

jurisdictions. The Committee heard examples of promising policing approaches to

address this important issue:

• In Quebec, the Sûreté du Québec coordinates the fight against organized

crime across the province in cooperation with its “municipal, Indigenous,

provincial, national and international partners.”

144

In recent years, with

the help of additional funding from the federal and provincial

governments, the Sûreté du Québec has established “two new teams,

one dedicated to firearms manufacturing, importing and trafficking cases

and the other to organized-crime-related disappearances and

murders.”

145

At the municipal level, the SPVM and the SPAL have both

established units dedicated to gun and gang violence.

146

Further, the

SPVM has a strategic plan to address gun violence which “mobilizes

police officers around short- , medium- and long-term action. The plan

rests on two pillars: an integrated and concerted strategy, and a

commitment from all stakeholders.”

147

• In British Columbia, the Vancouver Police Department has an organized

crime section, which includes a “task force responsible for reducing gang

143

Ibid., (Scott Harris, Vice-President, Intelligence and Enforcement Branch, Canada Border Services Agency).

144

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Benoît Dubé, Chief Inspector, Director Criminal Investigation, Sûreté

du Québec).

145

Ibid.

146

Ibid., (Fady Dagher, Director, Service de police de l’agglomération de Longueuil).

147

SECU, Evidence, 17 February 2022 (David Bertrand, Chief Inspector, Criminal Investigative Services, Service

de police de la Ville de Montréal).

violence within the city of Vancouver.”

148

The task force’s mandate is “to

target people and groups involved in the Lower Mainland gang conflict”

and also to “investigate the possession, trafficking and manufacturing

of firearms.”

149

• The Alberta Law Enforcement Response Teams (ALERT) is “a combined

law-enforcement model” that has had an impact on Alberta’s ability to

combat organized and serious crime.

150

• The Toronto Police Service has developed, in collaboration with key city

representatives, an “executive leadership table to facilitate greater public

safety collaboration” and has introduced a framework to tackle gun and

gang activity known as “SafeTO.”

151

4.1.3 Indigenous Police Services

Across the country several Indigenous police forces ensure the security of their

communities. These Indigenous police forces face many challenges in combatting gun

and gang violence. In particular, some Indigenous communities straddle Canada’s

international and provincial borders, which brings additional challenges and makes the

communities vulnerable to drug and gun smuggling and trafficking.

4.1.3.1 Akwesasne

During the study, the Akwesasne Mohawk Police Service (AMPS) and the Mohawk

Council of Akwesasne expressed to the Committee their commitment to ensuring public

safety. They emphasized the challenges their geography poses, making them vulnerable

to gun smuggling and trafficking and requiring them to have specialized patrols. Indeed,

the Akwesasne territory is a known route for smugglers.

152

148

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Michael Rowe, Staff Sergeant, Vancouver Police Department).

149

Ibid.

150

SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Dale McFee, Chief of Police, Edmonton Police Service).

151

“Introduced in 2021, SafeTO is a city-led collaborative plan that includes the development of a

comprehensive multi-sector gun violence reduction plan, which is to address the complex challenges posed

by gun and gang activity. The goal is to shift from reliance on a reactive and siloed response towards a

model of integrated prevention and intervention that tackles upstream root causes.” SECU, Evidence, 8

February 2022 (Myron Demkiw, Deputy Chief, Toronto Police Service).

152

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Stephen White, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized Policing Services, Royal

Canadian Mounted Police).

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

AND GANG VIOLENCE IN CANADA

The Akwesasne territory is divided by a land border with the U.S. and straddles two

provinces: Quebec and Ontario.

153

The St. Lawrence River also forms a border of their

territory. The Mohawk Council of Akwesasne indicated that half of its 13,100 members

reside in Quebec or Ontario and the other half in the State of New York. There are two

customs points that “allow access onto the territory: Dundee and Cornwall.”

154

Also,

since the territory is located in two provinces, the laws of Quebec or Ontario may apply.

Shawn Dulude, Chief of Police of the AMPS, explained that, since the international and

provincial borders run through the St. Lawrence River, “it requires a specialized marine

patrol unit,”

155

which has been provided through a bilateral agreement with Ontario.

Moreover, “the river can still be used by smugglers to bring in their contraband, even

when it is frozen,”

156

using automobiles and snowmobiles or motorboats in some

unfrozen sections of the river.

4.2 The Need for Law Enforcement Agencies to Be Appropriately

Funded

The Committee heard repeatedly that law enforcement agencies need to be

appropriately funded and staffed to fulfil their mandates and to effectively combat gun

and gang violence. In fact, when resources are scarce, law enforcement agencies adopt a

reactive role as they focus on the most pressing priorities. This means they cannot work

proactively on larger-scale issues.

157

During the study, recent investments made by the Government of Canada and provincial

governments directed at law enforcement agencies to combat gun and gang violence

were discussed. However, although the recent investments were deemed welcome and

useful, some witnesses cautioned the Committee that the lack of resources is still a

concern for many law enforcement agencies, preventing them from effectively

combatting gun and gang violence.

158

Brian Sauvé from the National Police Federation underlined that, over the past number

of years, the RCMP has faced different challenges, including “staffing levels, recruitment

153

SECU, Evidence, 3 February 2022 (Shawn Dulude, Chief of Police, Akwesasne Mohawk Police Service).

154

Ibid.

155

Ibid.

156

Ibid.

157

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Brian Sauvé, President, National Police Federation).

158

Ibid.; SECU, Evidence, 3 February 2022 (Maurice Sabourin, President, Winnipeg Police Association).

and member well-being,”

159

and that all areas of policing “have experienced a significant

increase in demand for services beyond crime prevention and law enforcement.”

160

As a

result, the National Police Federation recommends that the federal government provide

additional funding to the RCMP and to social program initiatives “so that RCMP

Members can concentrate their efforts towards law enforcement and crime

prevention.”

161

With regard to the CBSA, Mark Weber, National President of the Customs and

Immigration Union, indicated that increasing technology and putting money towards

intelligence make sense but “must go hand in hand with adequate staffing numbers.

Technology must be used to assist, not to replace, our actual presence in the field.”

162

emphasized that “[m]ost ports of entry are chronically understaffed and officers are

overworked”

163

and that several ports of entry are running “predominantly on

overtime.”

164

He stated that their “ability to effectively intercept smuggled goods such as

illegal firearms has been severely affected.”

165

In that sense, he suggested that an

increase of 1,000 or 1,500 border agents would be needed.

166

He added that the CBSA

currently has a recruitment problem and, in order to help staffing, the recent changes

made to the recruitment system, which make the process longer and result in officers

“working in places where they don't really want to be,”

167

should be reviewed.

This lack of resources affects not only law enforcement agencies at the federal level but

also provincial and municipal police forces, which also highlighted the need for

additional resources.

Maurice Sabourin, President of the Winnipeg Police Association, expressed concerns

that they do not currently have the resources to combat gun and gang violence:

Our complement in the last six years has decreased by over 100 police officers, and we

have become a completely reactive service. There is no patrolling of back lanes anymore

159

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Brian Sauvé, President, National Police Federation).

160

Ibid.

161

In its brief to the Committee, the National Police Federation makes specific recommendations as to how

much funding should be provided to the RCMP. SECU, Brief, National Police Federation, February 2022, p. 4.

162

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Mark Weber, National President, Customs and Immigration Union).

163

Ibid.

164

Ibid.

165

Ibid.

166

Ibid.

167

Ibid.

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

AND GANG VIOLENCE IN CANADA

to curb gang or gun violence. The unfortunate thing is that we could use more resources

on the street […].

168

He pointed out that only one of their members was dedicated to gang prevention and

that more resources directed towards this issue were needed.

169

Deputy Chief Myron Demkiw from the Toronto Police Service indicated that additional

resources should be directed at “greater tracing, greater analysis and greater integration

of data as it relates to what that teaches us, so that we can deal with the flow of

firearms onto our streets from a law enforcement perspective.”

170

Staff Sergeant Michael Rowe from the Vancouver Police Department also highlighted the

need for increased funding, particularly “to put together local municipal firearms

enforcement teams.”

171

Consequently, the Committee recommends:

Recommendation 14

That the Government of Canada recognize the importance of increasing police resources

to combat gang violence, with particular emphasis on enhancing youth and young adult

gang diversion efforts, while encouraging greater diversity in police services.

4.2.1 The Need for Indigenous Police Services to Be Adequately Funded

The question of ensuring that Indigenous police services are adequately funded is an

issue on which the Committee has already taken a position in its report entitled Systemic

Racism in Policing in Canada.

172

In this report, the Committee made recommendations

to the government of Canada, among other things, to ensure that Indigenous police

services be adequately funded and to designate them as essential services.

Through tripartite policing agreements, the federal and provincial governments fund

policing services in First Nation and Inuit communities. Among other things, through

these agreements, a First Nation or Inuit community can manage its own police service

168

SECU, Evidence, 3 February 2022 (Maurice Sabourin, President, Winnipeg Police Association).

169

Ibid.

170

SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Myron Demkiw, Deputy Chief, Toronto Police Service).

171

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Michael Rowe, Staff Sergeant, Vancouver Police Department).

172

SECU, First Report, 44

Parliament, 1

Session; SECU, Systemic Racism in Policing in Canada, 6

Report,

Parliament, 2

Session, June 2021.

in accordance with the laws of the province or territory. However, these Indigenous

police services are not currently considered essential services.

During the study, the Mohawk Council of Akwesasne and the AMPS expressed the need

for additional funding.

173

Chief Shawn Dulude of the AMPS indicated that they are

currently not equipped to combat drug and gun smuggling and trafficking because of the

specific challenges presented by the location of their territory. He underlined that they

lack the personnel required to conduct round-the-clock surveillance of their “waterways

and all the land leading to the St. Lawrence River.”

174

As explained by Grand Chief Abram Benedict of the Mohawk Council of Akwesasne,

additional resources are needed to enhance their capacity and their ability to conduct

lengthy investigations, and to invest in technology that will enable them to patrol the

25 kilometres of waterways on their territory.

175

However, the budget of the AMPS “has not seen a significant increase in the last several

years, except with respect to Ontario, which has provided specific funding for five years

to create a snowmobile, all-terrain vehicle and vessel enforcement unit known as

SAVE.”

176

Grand Chief Benedict highlighted Public Safety Canada’s 2019 report entitled

Evaluation of the Akwesasne Organized Crime Initiative, which included the

recommendation to “[c]ontinue to support the Akwesasne Mohawk Police Service in

building their capacity to ensure their full participation on the Joint Investigative Team

and contribution to the disruption of organized crime in and around Akwesasne.”

177

Grand Chief Benedict was of the view that designating their police service as an essential

service would ensure that they have access to adequate resources.

After consideration of the evidence, the Committee recommends:

173

SECU, Evidence, 3 February 2022 (Abram Benedict, Grand Chief, Mohawk Council of Akwesasne) (Shawn

Dulude, Chief of Police, Akwesasne Mohawk Police Service).

174

SECU, Evidence, 3 February 2022 (Shawn Dulude, Chief of Police, Akwesasne Mohawk Police Service). Chief

of Police Dulude explained that, since the St. Lawrence River runs along the border, “it requires a specialized

marine patrol unit” and this patrol has been provided through a bilateral agreement with Ontario. However,

he underlined that he recently asked the Quebec's Department of Public Security for a similar agreement, as

the funds provided by Ontario are “not sufficient to have patrols around the clock, seven days a week.”

175

Ibid., (Abram Benedict, Grand Chief, Mohawk Council of Akwesasne).

176

Ibid., (Abram Benedict, Grand Chief, Mohawk Council of Akwesasne); (Shawn Dulude, Chief of Police,

Akwesasne Mohawk Police Service).

177

Public Safety Canada, Evaluation of the Akwesasne Organized Crime Initiative, Report, 2019.

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

AND GANG VIOLENCE IN CANADA

Recommendation 15

That the Government of Canada increase funding to the Akwesasne Mohawk Police

Service, promote economic development in Akwesasne, and encourage the surrounding

police of jurisdiction to strengthen collaboration and information sharing with

Akwesasne and other border communities to ensure improvement in law enforcement’s

ability to intercept illegal firearms at the provincial and international border.

Recommendation 16

That the Government of Canada fully implement the three recommendations from

Public Safety Canada’s 2019 report entitled Evaluation of the Akwesasne Organized

Crime Initiative:

• Continue to support the Akwesasne Mohawk Police Service in building

their capacity to ensure their full participation on the Joint Investigative

Team and contribution to the disruption of organized crime in and

around Akwesasne.

• Identify the appropriate funding mechanism (e.g. multi-year

contribution agreement or grant) to support the Akwesasne Mohawk

Police Service’s sustained long-term participation in the Joint

Investigative Team.

• Explore opportunities to streamline administrative requirements for the

Akwesasne Mohawk Police Service and internal Public Safety Canada

practices to increase efficiency and address existing burdens on both

the recipient and Public Safety Canada staff. This could include revising

reporting requirements, considering longer term funding and increasing

coordination with other programs.

Recommendation 17

That the Government of Canada ensure that as it co-develops a legislative framework for

First Nations policing which recognizes it as an essential service, that Indigenous police

services like the Akwesasne Mohawk Police Service are part of the co-development

process.

4.3 The Need to Strengthen Border Controls

The border that separates Canada and the U.S. is the longest undefended border in the

world. As emphasized by several witnesses, Canada’s geography and the length of its

border, as well as the wide availability of firearms in the U.S, one of the biggest weapons

manufacturers in the world, come “with [their] own unique set of security

challenges.”

178

During the study, several witnesses identified gun smuggling as a

troubling issue in Canada. As mentioned in Chapter 2, although the tracing of crime guns

needs to be improved, based on the evidence provided by most local law enforcement

agencies, a considerable portion of crime guns used in Canada are smuggled across

the border.

Responsibility for the issue of gun smuggling is shared between the RCMP and CBSA.

While CBSA has “the mandate at ports of entry for the enforcement […] the RCMP has

the mandate in between ports of entry.”

179

As discussed later in the report, this requires

close collaboration between the RCMP, the CBSA and different U.S. stakeholders. The

Committee was informed that recent investments to combat smuggling and to enhance

CBSA’s technology and intelligence sharing have been made by the federal

government.

180

For example, the RCMP indicated that the federal government has

invested $40.3 million over five years and $5.5 million in ongoing funding to assist them

in addressing firearms smuggling. The CBSA also indicated that the federal government

has made a “five-year investment of $38.5 million, with an ongoing amount of over

$6 million”

181

that will, among other things, be used to enhance its technology and its

intelligence and investigative capacity.

RCMP Commissioner Brenda Lucki clarified that their mandate with regard to gun

smuggling focuses on the areas between ports of entry; however, the RCMP is “not

designed to actually provide a patrol function along the border in its entirety.”

182

She

specified that they must deploy their “limited resources in line with the threat

environment” and would welcome “investments in additional investigative capacity and

178

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Mark Weber, National President, Customs and Immigration Union). See

also, SECU, Brief, National Police Federation, February 2022, p. 5; SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Michael

Duheme, Deputy Commissioner, Federal Policing, Royal Canadian Mounted Police).

179

SECU, Evidence, 16 December 2021 (John Ossowski, President, Canada Border Services Agency).

180

Ibid., (Hon. Marco Mendicino, Minister of Public Safety).

181

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Scott Harris, Vice-President, Intelligence and Enforcement Branch, Canada

Border Services Agency).

182

SECU, Evidence, 16 December 2021 (Brenda Lucki, Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police).

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

AND GANG VIOLENCE IN CANADA

especially technology, which would further strengthen our capabilities to counter

these threats.”

183

Mark Weber of the Customs and Immigration Union explained that, currently, CBSA

border officers are “restricted in their ability to act outside of ports of entry and must

rely on other agencies, mainly the RCMP, to address issues related to so-called ‘port

runners’ or other criminal activities occurring in-between ports.”

184

He further explained

that CBSA officers who are witnessing suspect activities between ports of entry are

expected to make a phone call, noting “[t]he attitude seems to be very much that you

are to sit at your port of entry, and anything outside of there is not your problem. Phone

someone.”

185

In his view, this situation slows down CBSA’s “general ability to react in a

timely fashion to problematic situations and it weakens the integrity of our border.”

186

He was of the opinion that, to address firearms smuggling, simple legislative changes

could be made to expand the mandate of the CBSA’s border officers.

187

This would allow

border officers to collaborate with the RCMP in patrolling between border crossings.

188

Mark Weber also warned the Committee of issues at the marine and railway levels that

are undermining Canada’s ability to control the flow of illegal firearms:

At the marine level, the overall reporting infrastructure is both insufficient and

outdated. Once again, officers lack the necessary tools and authority to intervene,

impacting their ability to intercept dangerous goods.

Perhaps most glaring of all are the rail mode operations, where, according to the union’s

own data, as of 2019, only one one-millionth of all rail cargo was effectively being

examined. The reality is that our current operational abilities in the rail field are virtually

non-existent. Canada has almost zero examination capabilities directly at the border,

due in part to geographical issues, inadequate tools and political decisions not to force

rail carriers to supply the necessary facilities. In other words, there’s almost a zero per

cent chance that any illegal weapons entering the country via rail will ever be found. All

these operational gaps find themselves compounded by the aforementioned staffing

shortage.

189

183

Ibid.

184

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Mark Weber, National President, Customs and Immigration Union).

185

Ibid.

186

Ibid.

187

Ibid.

188

Ibid.

189

Ibid.

On the issue of rail mode operations, CBSA President John Ossowski indicated that “with

the rail lines that are trusted traders, the actual materials are considered in bond until

they arrive in the country” and that they “have insights into how they maintain the

security of the conveyances.”

190

He further explained that

around two to two and half million rail cars come into the country every year, so when I

look at that risk level compared to the travel regime or other sort of modes necessarily

and given the data and the risk profiles, rail is not something that we think is as big a risk

as the union conveyed.

[…]

What we would like to do is actually start working upstream where the rail cars are

assembled in the United States and target using the intelligence approach that we’re

focusing on right now to make sure we’re targeting the right train before it actually gets

into the country.

191

Therefore, the Committee recommends:

Recommendation 18

That the Government of Canada recognize that smuggling is a significant contributor to

gun and gang violence in Canada and that more resources must be allocated to firearms

smuggling.

Recommendation 19

That the Government of Canada investigate the need for enhanced border surveillance

of international commercial rail operations and ocean freight shipping operations.

Recommendation 20

That the Government of Canada allocate additional human and financial resources to the

Canada Border Services Agency to enable them to better investigate and apprehend

those attempting to smuggle illegal firearms into Canada, including innovative

technological solutions.

190

SECU, Evidence, 1 March 2022 (John Ossowski, President, Canada Border Services Agency).

191

Ibid.

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

AND GANG VIOLENCE IN CANADA

4.4 The Need for Enhanced Collaboration, Coordination and

Partnerships

All law enforcement agencies that appeared before the Committee already collaborate

with partners to confront gun and gang violence. Indeed, during the study, several

witnesses updated the Committee on initiatives already in place to collaborate,

coordinate and build partnerships with different law enforcement agencies to fight gun

and gang violence, including in the area of information-sharing. Moreover, some

witnesses stressed that law enforcement agencies could not wage an effective fight

against gun and gang violence without collaboration, coordination and partnership

between the different law enforcement agencies, and they pointed out that they are

constantly looking for ways to work more collaboratively to be more effective.

192

As highlighted by RCMP Commissioner Brenda Lucki, the most efficient ways of tackling

gun violence include good intelligence-gathering and collaboration between all police

services and partner agencies such as the CBSA to ensure they are “able to share that

information and turn the intelligence into evidence; and following the chain of where

things are seized.”

193

Like several other witnesses, RCMP Deputy Commissioner Stephen White contended

that gathering and intelligence sharing between law enforcement agencies is key to

successful law enforcement action:

The more intelligence and the better intelligence we can share between law

enforcement agencies right across the country, the better understanding we’ll have of

the criminal landscape and the more insights we’ll have of how we counter that.

194

192

For example, see SECU, Evidence, 16 December 2021 (Brenda Lucki, Commissioner, Royal Canadian

Mounted Police); SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Stephen White, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized

Policing Services, Royal Canadian Mounted Police); (Scott Harris, Vice-President, Intelligence and

Enforcement Branch, Canada Border Services Agency); SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Myron Demkiw,

Deputy Chief, Toronto Police Service); SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Benoît Dubé, Chief Inspector,

Director Criminal Investigation, Sûreté du Québec); SECU, Evidence, 17 February 2022 (David Bertrand, Chief

Inspector, Criminal Investigative Services, Service de police de la Ville de Montréal).

193

SECU, Evidence, 16 December 2021 (Brenda Lucki, Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police).

194

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Stephen White, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized Policing Services, Royal

Canadian Mounted Police). See also, SECU, Evidence, 16 December 2021 (Brenda Lucki, Commissioner,

Royal Canadian Mounted Police); SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Stephen White, Deputy Commissioner,

Specialized Policing Services, Royal Canadian Mounted Police); (Scott Harris, Vice-President, Intelligence and

Enforcement Branch, Canada Border Services Agency); SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Myron Demkiw,

Deputy Chief, Toronto Police Service); SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Michael Rowe, Staff Sergeant,

Vancouver Police Department).

As mentioned previously, data gathering associated with the tracing of firearms will

provide the intelligence law enforcement agencies need to tackle gang and gun violence,

particularly gun trafficking and smuggling.

195

In fact, witnesses affirmed that this

additional intelligence will help the RCMP to collaborate with the CBSA and other police

jurisdictions to target the routes for firearms smuggling and straw purchasing

activities.

196

Underlining the importance of intelligence sharing, the RCMP indicated that

they are, as mentioned in Chapter 2, “in the process of developing a brand new, modern

national criminal intelligence service system that will be used by all police services

across the country for organized crime intelligence, gang intelligence, and included in

there will be firearms intelligence.”

197

Furthermore, the Committee was informed about Operation Centaur, a strategy

launched by the Government of Quebec to combat gun violence that focuses on

optimized cooperation between different law enforcement agencies. Witnesses

confirmed that the operation appears to be working well. Of note, information sharing

and intelligence is one of the goals of Operation Centaur.

198

As part of the operation,

they expanded their team dedicated to firearms cases to create a joint team – the

integrated weapons enforcement team – which brings together the Sûreté du Québec,

the SPVM, the RCMP and the CBSA.

199

The operation depends on the cooperation of all

partners, and their “joint investigation teams are backed by the involvement of the

RCMP, CBSA, the Ontario Provincial Police, or OPP, and 26 municipal police forces.”

200

With regard to combatting gun smuggling and trafficking at the border, several witnesses

indicated that collaboration and cooperation initiatives are already in place with

national, provincial and municipal law enforcement agencies, as well as with

international partners.

201

For example, domestically, there is already an “integrated

195

SECU, Evidence, 16 December 2021 (Brenda Lucki, Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police).

196

Ibid.; SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Stephen White, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized Policing Services,

Royal Canadian Mounted Police).

197

SECU, Evidence, 16 December 2021 (Brenda Lucki, Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police).

198

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Benoît Dubé, Chief Inspector, Director Criminal Investigation, Sûreté du

Québec); SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Michael Duheme, Deputy Commissioner, Federal Policing, Royal

Canadian Mounted Police); SECU, Evidence, 17 February 2022 (David Bertrand, Chief Inspector, Criminal

Investigative Services, Service de police de la Ville de Montréal).

199

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Benoît Dubé, Chief Inspector, Director Criminal Investigation, Sûreté

du Québec).

200

Ibid.

201

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Michael Duheme, Deputy Commissioner, Federal Policing, Royal Canadian

Mounted Police); (Scott Harris, Vice-President, Intelligence and Enforcement Branch, Canada Border

Services Agency).

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

AND GANG VIOLENCE IN CANADA

border enforcement team, which coordinates the RCMP and provincial police services

through joint operations.”

202

Scott Harris, Vice-President of the Intelligence and

Enforcement Branch at the CBSA, also mentioned that they “currently have over 13 joint

force operations with the RCMP, and other police or jurisdictions across the country, that

are yielding results.”

203

He also pointed out that, in 2021, the CBSA established a cross-

border task force on firearms that involves the CBSA, the RCMP and different American

partners, including the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the U.S.

Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

204

Brian Sauvé from the National Police Federation maintained that coordination was a

challenge for police forces and that a centre should be created to coordinate the efforts

of various teams, including the integrated border enforcement teams, national weapons

enforcement support teams and the Canadian Firearms Program.

205

Several witnesses also highlighted that effective collaboration, coordination and

partnerships between law enforcement agencies and community services are essential

in the fight against gun and gang violence. Deputy Chief Myron Demkiw from the

Toronto Police Service explained:

Community safety is a shared responsibility that requires coordination and collaboration

between all levels of government, the police, communities and social services to

address the complex root causes that lead individuals to use a criminal firearm in the

first place.

206

Several witnesses mentioned various programs and initiatives to combat gun and gang

violence, such as the successful Surrey RCMP “Shattering the Image” anti-gang program,

which involves both the RCMP and community partners in Surrey.

207

4.4.1 Collaboration with Indigenous Police Forces

To tackle gun and gang violence, Indigenous police services, like their counterparts in

police services across the country, need to collaborate with other law enforcement

202

Ibid., (Michael Duheme, Deputy Commissioner, Federal Policing, Royal Canadian Mounted Police).

203

Ibid., (Scott Harris, Vice-President, Intelligence and Enforcement Branch, Canada Border Services Agency).

204

Ibid.

205

Ibid., (Brian Sauvé, President, National Police Federation).

206

SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Myron Demkiw, Deputy Chief, Toronto Police Service).

207

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Brian Sauvé, President, National Police Federation).

agencies to gather the intelligence necessary to arrest individuals engaged in criminal

activities.

The Minister of Public Safety indicated that his government

is committed to working with Indigenous leaders and communities across the country to

ensure that we are collaborating with them in a way that allows Indigenous leadership

to ensure public safety across communities.

[…]

We are going to make sure we are investing additional financial resources to co-develop

the policies and the regulatory and administrative frameworks, which begins with

Indigenous perspectives in our communities.

208

The RCMP told the Committee that the integrated enforcement teams that were set up

for the sharing of intelligence and investigations work “very well and do include

Indigenous police services.”

209

For example, RCMP Commissioner Brenda Lucki indicated

that the RCMP has “joined forces with the Akwesasne, the Kanesatake and the

Kahnawake police” to tackle gun violence.

210

With regard to Akwesasne, Chief Shawn Dulude of the AMPS explained that the fact that

their community straddles the border with the U.S. adds to the challenges facing the

police force since the different jurisdictions mean that “[o]ur authority as peace officers

and as police ends as soon as we cross the border with the United States.”

211

This

requires even further collaboration with other law enforcement agencies, including a lot

of information sharing regarding criminal activities.

Addressing this issue, RCMP Deputy Commissioner of Federal Policing Michael Duheme

indicated that the RCMP is “working closely with the Akwesasne Mohawk Police Service,

the Sûreté du Québec detachment in Salaberry-de-Valleyfield and the one in Cornwall,

208

SECU, Evidence, 16 December 2021 (Hon. Marco Mendicino, Minister of Public Safety).

209

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Stephen White, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized Policing Services, Royal

Canadian Mounted Police); (Michael Duheme, Deputy Commissioner, Federal Policing, Royal Canadian

Mounted Police).

210

SECU, Evidence, 16 December 2021 (Brenda Lucki, Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police).

211

SECU, Evidence, 3 February 2022 (Shawn Dulude, Chief of Police, Akwesasne Mohawk Police Service).

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

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our American partners at U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and our

integrated teams.”

212

Indeed, Chief Dulude pointed out that his police service is part of various groups,

including the integrated border enforcement teams. However, Grand Chief Benedict

underlined that although the AMPS “is part of a joint investigative team with the RCMP,

OPP, SQ and CBSA,” they need “to be part of the joint forums on border activities, policy

and law development”

213

and “to be at the table where decisions are made and

intelligence is shared.”

214

4.5 The Need for Adequately Resourced Prosecution Services and

Appropriate Sentencing

Law enforcement is a big part of dealing with illegal firearms, organized crime and gang

activities, “but equally big is the full continuum of Canada’s justice system.”

215

Indeed,

when investigations lead to arrests, the important work of prosecution comes into play.

Chief Inspector Benoît Dubé of the Sûreté du Québec illustrated the importance of

prosecution services being appropriately resourced. He explained that as a result of

recent investments by the Quebec government in Operation Centaur, there has been an

increase in operations and arrests related to illegal firearms.

216

Chief Inspector David Bertrand from the SPVM underlined the complexity of

investigations involving firearms:

It’s important to understand that firearms investigations are complex and demanding

for those who conduct them, particularly because of the legal requirements that must

be met. Evidence relies heavily on investigative techniques, as few witnesses and victims

cooperate in these types of investigations.

217

212

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Michael Duheme, Deputy Commissioner, Federal Policing, Royal Canadian

Mounted Police).

213

SECU, Evidence, 3 February 2022 (Abram Benedict, Grand Chief, Mohawk Council of Akwesasne).

214

Ibid.

215

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Stephen White, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized Policing Services, Royal

Canadian Mounted Police).

216

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Benoît Dubé, Chief Inspector, Director Criminal Investigation, Sûreté

du Québec).

217

SECU, Evidence, 17 February 2022 (David Bertrand, Chief Inspector, Criminal Investigative Services, Service

de police de la Ville de Montréal).

Further, the courts have a central role to play in sentencing, a topic that was discussed

by various witnesses, who shared their views with the Committee.

Dale McFee, Chief of Police, Edmonton Police Service, highlighted the need for

appropriate sentences, depending on the offences committed. He indicated that

individuals who commit serious offences should be held accountable and be sentenced

to prison; however, he argued that individuals who commit low-risk crimes should not

be me mixed with high-risk offenders because, when that happens, “they all become

high-risk.”

218

The Minister of Public Safety also recognized the importance of sentencing in reducing

gun and gang violence, stating that “where appropriate, there do need to be jail

sentences, and we must trust our courts and our judges to dispense, with justice, where

appropriate.”

219

Brian Sauvé from the National Police Federation stated that “well-resourced, well-

conducted investigations, along with sentencing, will help drive deterrence.”

220

Indeed,

he indicated that strong sentencing might counter the appearance of a “revolving door”

in the criminal justice system, which “enables repeat offenders to walk free repeatedly

after being arrested and awaiting trial.”

221

Maurice Sabourin from the Winnipeg Police

Federation also spoke about the revolving door phenomenon, noting that further crimes

are often committed when “offenders are not kept in remand or kept in incarceration

until court dates.” That being said, according to criminal defence lawyer Michael Spratt,

claims that people arrested for gun crimes “are back out on the streets the very next

day” are not supported by the data.

222

Various discussions about sentencing took place in the context of the proposed repeal of

certain mandatory minimum sentences.

223

Bill C-5, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Controlled Drugs and Substances

Act, which was introduced in the House of Commons on 7 December 2021, would,

218

SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Dale McFee, Chief of Police, Edmonton Police Service).

219

SECU, Evidence, 16 December 2021 (Hon. Marco Mendicino, Minister of Public Safety).

220

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Brian Sauvé, President, National Police Federation).

221

SECU, Brief, National Police Federation, February 2022, p. 8.

222

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Michael Spratt, Partner, Abergel Goldstein & Partners LLP, As an

Individual).

223

SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Robert Henry, Assistant Professor, Department of Indigenous Studies,

University of Saskatchewan, As an Individual).

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

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among other things, remove mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment for

certain offences in the Criminal Code that relate to firearms.

224

However, mandatory

minimum sentences would remain in place for the Criminal Code offences that are

considered by the federal government to be more serious or related to the trafficking

and smuggling of firearms.

225

Although it did not feature in Bill C-5, the Minister of

Public Safety indicated that the federal government is committed to increasing “the

maximum penalty for firearms trafficking, smuggling and related offences from 10 to 14

years imprisonment.”

226

With respect to concerns over the proposed repeal of mandatory minimum sentences,

the Minister of Public Safety reiterated the principle of judicial independence and

pointed out that “we trust that the courts will dispense those sentences, where

appropriate, in accordance with the principles under the criminal code and the

charter.”

227

He went on to say that section 718.2 of the Criminal Code allows for the

courts to consider aggravating factors.

228

For his part, Chief Inspector David Bertrand from the SPVM was of the opinion that

“discussions about minimum sentences in certain gun usage and possession situations

should be brought back to the forefront.”

229

Moreover, Matthew Hipwell, an RCMP veteran now representing Wolverine Supplies, a

gun supplier, was of the opinion that by reducing mandatory minimum penalties, the

deterrent element is no longer present and “we are failing to hold people and

individuals accountable for their actions.”

230

224

Bill C-5, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, 44

Parliament,

Session. Bill C-5 is almost identical to Bill C-22 which was introduced in February 2021, but died on the

Order Paper. Bill C-22, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act,

Parliament, 2

Session.

225

SECU, Evidence, 16 December 2021 (Hon. Marco Mendicino, Minister of Public Safety).

226

SECU, Evidence, 1 March 2022 (Hon. Marco Mendicino, Minister of Public Safety).

227

Ibid.

228

Ibid.

229

SECU, Evidence, 17 February 2022 (David Bertrand, Chief Inspector, Criminal Investigative Services, Service

de police de la Ville de Montréal).

230

Ibid., (Matthew Hipwell, President, Wolverine Supplies).

Maurice Sabourin from the Winnipeg Police Federation also expressed concerns

regarding Bill C-5, particularly as he saw benefits to longer incarceration terms.

231

This discussion regarding mandatory minimum sentences must consider the rulings of

the Supreme Court of Canada

232

and various appeal courts, which found some

mandatory minimum penalties in the context of firearms unconstitutional. Criminal

defence lawyer Michael Spratt told the Committee that “the Supreme Court of Canada

ruled mandatory minimum punishments in the firearm context unconstitutional, and

we’ve seen them struck down in a variety of offences across the country.”

233

Addressing

the view of some that minimum penalties act as a deterrent, he argued that even if

mandatory minimum penalties were available, they are not effective at deterring crime:

“it seems that they might actually increase recidivism and they disproportionately affect

so many historically marginalized and disadvantaged groups. They’re also incredibly

expensive.”

234

231

SECU, Evidence, 3 February 2022 (Maurice Sabourin, President, Winnipeg Police Association).

232

For example, see R. v. Nur, [2015] 1 SCR 773.

233

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Michael Spratt, Partner, Abergel Goldstein & Partners LLP, As an

Individual).

234

Ibid.

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

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CHAPTER 5—GUN CONTROL

While we cannot rely solely on criminal law to reduce gun and gang violence and must

allocate more resources to its prevention, gun control remains an important issue for

Parliament, which has jurisdiction to legislate in the area of criminal law to enhance

“public safety by controlling access to firearms through prohibitions and penalties.”

235

fact, as Brian Sauvé from the National Police Federation, points out, “[e]vidence-based

firearm controls are vital to ensuring that the ownership and use of firearms is as safe

as possible.”

236

During the study, various discussions took place regarding the best ways to use gun

control to reduce gun violence. This chapter addresses gun control from the various

perspectives raised by witnesses.

5.1 Classification of Firearms and Firearm Offences

Currently, Part III of the Criminal Code

237

sets out three classes of firearms: prohibited,

restricted, and non-restricted.

According to criminal defence lawyer Solomon Friedman, since the “passage of the

original Firearms Act in 1992, which delineated what were non-restricted, restricted and

prohibited firearms,” successive governments have used orders in council either to add

or remove firearms from that list instead of amending the current legislative

framework.

238

This has led to a system that is irrational and “widely seen as unfair and

unpredictable.”

239

In particular, he indicated that instead of classifying firearms by appearance, the current

firearms framework should be amended to “classify firearms based on their inherent

danger, their use and other evidence-based criteria.”

240

Similar views were shared by

Matthew Hipwell, President of Wolverine Supplies.

241

235

Reference re Firearms Act (Can.), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783, para. 4.

236

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Brian Sauvé, President, National Police Federation).

237

Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s. 84.

238

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Solomon Friedman, Criminal Defence Lawyer, As an Individual).

239

Ibid.

240

Ibid.

241

SECU, Evidence, 17 February 2022 (Matthew Hipwell, President, Wolverine Supplies).

On a different note, criminal defence lawyer Solomon Friedman indicated that our

current firearm legislative framework makes all firearm offences Criminal Code offences

and stated that this framework should be amended to distinguish between crimes of a

regulatory nature and more reprehensible crimes. He explained that

we need a legal framework that distinguishes between what the Supreme Court has

called the regulatory end of the spectrum and the true crime end of the spectrum. […]

The rural Manitoban who leaves her rifle in her locked hunting cabinet without a trigger

lock on it and the gang member with a handgun tucked in his waistband are subject to

the same legal regime. A free-standing regulatory scheme for non-violent firearms

offences is long overdue. It would ensure that the criminal sanction is only applied to

the morally blameworthy.

242

Therefore, the Committee recommends:

Recommendation 21

That the Government of Canada develop a legal framework that distinguishes between

regulatory and criminal firearms offenses in order to provide limited police resources the

ability to focus on violent crime and gang activity.

Recommendation 22

That the Government of Canada develop a standardized schedule and definitions of

prohibited firearms within the Criminal Code of Canada, with an emphasis on simplicity

and consistency.

5.2 Ban on Certain Firearms and Buyback Program

During the study, witnesses discussed the ban on certain firearms and the buyback

program introduced by the federal government, and their effectiveness in preventing

gun and gang violence.

In May 2020, the government prohibited over 1,500 firearms.

243

A two-year amnesty

order is in effect until 30 April 2022 for owners to comply with the new rules in place

concerning the banned firearms.

244

The Minister of Public Safety reiterated to the

Committee that “[n]ow that we have banned assault rifles, we have to take the next

242

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Solomon Friedman, Criminal Defence Lawyer, As an Individual).

243

SECU, Evidence, 16 December 2021 (Hon. Marco Mendicino, Minister of Public Safety).

244

Royal Canadian Mounted Police, What you need to know about the Government of Canada’s new

prohibition on certain firearms and devices.

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

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steps and implement a buyback program. […] We are going to make the buyback

program mandatory.”

245

Recently, the federal government extended the amnesty period

to October 2023 to implement the program.

246

In addition, in February 2021, the government introduced Bill C-21, An Act to amend

certain Acts and to make certain consequential amendments (firearms), which included

provisions that would have permitted municipalities to restrict handguns in their

jurisdictions if allowed by their province or territory.

247

Although Bill C-21 died on the

Order Paper, the Minister confirmed to the Committee the government’s intention to

move forward with further measures to restrict handguns, noting that the government

“is committed to investing one billion dollars to support those provinces and territories

that want to ban handguns.”

248

The Minister also indicated that new legislation is coming soon that will reintroduce

initiatives that died on the Order Paper.

249

5.2.1 Ban on Handguns

In Canada, most registered firearms are handguns. In fact, the Committee was informed

that there are approximately 1.1 million registered firearms: 96.7% of them are

handguns, which means that “approximately one million handguns are registered in

Canada.”

250

These registered handguns are owned by approximately 276,000 owners.

251

245

SECU, Evidence, 16 December 2021 (Hon. Marco Mendicino, Minister of Public Safety).

246

Department of Justice, Amendments to the Criminal Code Amnesty Order related to the May 1, 2020, ban

on assault-style firearms, Backgrounder, 2022.

247

Bill C-21, An Act to amend certain Acts and to make certain consequential amendments (firearms),

Parliament, 2

Session; Government of Canada, Public Safety Canada, Bill C-21: An Act to amend

certain Acts and to make certain consequential amendments (firearms).

248

SECU, Evidence, 16 December 2021 (Hon. Marco Mendicino, Minister of Public Safety).

249

SECU, Evidence, 1 March 2022 (Hon. Marco Mendicino, Minister of Public Safety).

250

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Stephen White, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized Policing Services, Royal

Canadian Mounted Police).

251

Ibid., (Kellie Paquette, Director General, Canadian Firearms Program, Royal Canadian Mounted Police).

Generally, in many parts of Canada, an increase in violence involving handguns has been

seen in recent years.

252

As noted in Chapter 2, in most urban areas, it is the principal

type of firearm used to commit firearm-related violent crimes.

Throughout the study, there were discussions about the best ways to prevent handgun

violence, particularly the advisability of the federal government’s plan to work with the

provinces, territories and municipalities that want to ban handguns.

On the one hand, some witnesses were of the view that banning handguns would be

inefficient in reducing gun violence since the handguns targeted by the ban are the legal

ones, and the vast majority of handguns used to commit crimes are smuggled into

Canada. As these handguns are obtained illegally, they bypass the regulatory scheme,

and the adoption of further restrictive legislation would have little to no effect on

them.

253

As pointed out by Chief Evan Bray from the Canadian Association of Chiefs of

Police who spoke generally about bans, “most of the laws we create are not going to be

followed by the people who are committing the crimes with the guns […] A ban is only as

good as the people who are willing to follow it.”

254

Moreover, according to Professor Caillin Langmann from the Department of Medicine at

McMaster University, whose research has examined firearms legislation from 1974 to

2008 and from 1981 to 2016, which does not consider all the changes that occurred

since 2016, including amendments found in Bill C-71, An Act to amend certain Acts and

Regulations in relation to firearms:

255

[N]o statistically significant beneficial associations were found between firearms

legislation and homicide by firearm, as well as spousal homicide by firearms, and the

criminal charge of “Discharge of a Firearm with Intent.” Bans of military-appearing

firearms, semiautomatic rifles and handguns, short barrel handguns and Saturday night

specials in the 1990s has resulted in no associated reduction in homicide rates. Social

and economic factors were associated with firearm homicide rates. For instance, the

older the age of the population was associated with a lower the rate of homicide using a

long gun while an increase in the unemployment rate was associated with an increase in

spousal homicide. Homicide by handgun, usually used by people involved in criminality,

252

For example, see SECU, Evidence, 16 December 2021 (Hon. Marco Mendicino, Minister of Public Safety);

SECU, Evidence, 3 February 2022 (Kevin Walker, Interim Executive Director, Bear Clan Patrol Inc.); SECU,

Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Jeff Latimer, Director General, Health, Justice, Diversity and Populations,

Statistics Canada).

253

For example, see SECU, Brief, Caillin Langmann, 8 February 2022; SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Myron

Demkiw, Deputy Chief, Toronto Police Service); (Evelyn Fox, Founder, Communities for Zero Violence);

SECU, Evidence, 17 February 2022 (Matthew Hipwell, President, Wolverine Supplies).

254

SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Evan Bray, Chief of Police, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police).

255

Bill C-71, An Act to amend certain Acts and Regulations in relation to firearms, 42

Parliament, 1

Session.

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

AND GANG VIOLENCE IN CANADA

was associated with an increase in the unemployment rate, poverty rates, and

immigration. As well the overall increase in incarceration was associated with increases

in homicide rates likely reflecting in increase in crime rates overall. These results suggest

further areas to study as well as beneficial areas to target by public policy to reduce

homicide rates.

256

In that sense, some witnesses argued that instead of investing resources to establish and

administer a handgun ban, resources should be directed to addressing the root causes of

gun and gang violence through intervention and prevention, as well as issues associated

with the detection of illegal firearms at the border.

257

Alternatively, some witnesses told the Committee that since handguns are the type of

firearm most often used to commit crimes, to effectively reduce gun violence, they

should be banned completely.

258

In other words, for these witnesses, the availability of

these firearms is part of the gun violence problem. They also believe that the threat

caused by handguns outweighs their utility.

259

According to criminal defence counsel

Christian Pearce:

[T]he one way that Parliament can really address gun availability because that’s the

easier side of the gun crime problem is through a complete ban on handguns. Handguns

are implicated in the crime gun problem in Toronto 95% and up of the time. There is

simply no legitimate arguable reason that I have heard in researching the book, thinking

about this issue over time that justifies the possession of handguns merely for sport and

collection purposes, when the downside risk is that those guns fall into the hands of

criminals and end up being used to create the kind of carnage that we see on Toronto

streets and in other cities around the country.

260

To address the argument that handguns are smuggled and that a ban would have little

or no effect, Michael Spratt, lawyer, noted that a ban on handguns would not be a

256

SECU, Brief, Caillin Langmann, 8 February 2022.

257

For example, see SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Evan Bray, Chief of Police, Canadian Association of

Chiefs of Police); (Caillin Langmann, Assistant Clinical Professor, Department of Medicine, McMaster

University, As an Individual (Myron Demkiw, Deputy Chief, Toronto Police Service); SECU, Evidence,

15 February 2022 (Evelyn Fox, Founder, Communities for Zero Violence); SECU, Evidence, 17 February 2022

(Matthew Hipwell, President, Wolverine Supplies).

258

For example, see SECU, Evidence, 15 February 2022 (Boufeldja Benabdallah, Spokesman, Centre culturel

islamique de Québec); (Heidi Rathjen, Coordinator, PolySeSouvient); (Wendy Cukier, President, Coalition for

Gun Contro); SECU, Evidence, 17 February 2022 (David Bertrand, Chief Inspector, Criminal Investigative

Services, Service de police de la Ville de Montréal); (Christian Pearce, Criminal Defence Counsel, Author, As

an Individual); SECU, Brief, Canadian Doctors for Protection from Guns, 27 February 2022.

259

SECU, Evidence, 15 February 2022 (Wendy Cukier, President, Coalition for Gun Control); SECU, Evidence,

17 February 2022 (Christian Pearce, Criminal Defence Counsel, Author, As an Individual).

260

SECU, Evidence, 17 February 2022 (Christian Pearce, Criminal Defence Counsel, Author, As an Individual).

“panacea” and that “domestic violence and domestic homicides often involve legal

handguns, and those are a large problem in terms of the number of homicides we

see.”

261

As mentioned previously, the diversion of legal guns to illegal markets, either

through theft, illegal sales or, in some instances, straw purchases, is a “significant

problem that must be considered.”

262

Some witnesses pointed out that if a handgun ban is contemplated, it should be a

federal ban, not one based on the will of provinces, territories or municipalities, since

the movement of people and goods between provinces is unaffected by borders.

263

Finally, Christian Pearce, criminal lawyer, added that if Parliament decides not to go

forward with a handgun ban, a cap on handgun ownership could be considered.

264

Similar views were made by the Canadian Doctors for Protection from Guns regarding a

limit of ownership for all firearms.

265

According to Pearce, some people may value the

fact of using a handgun for sport shooting purposes, but having multiple handguns

“defies any rational argument when the risk is that those guns will be stolen in aggregate

globally and then become crime guns on the street.”

266

Given the importance of this issue and the need to improve our knowledge on domestic

diversion of firearms, the Committee recommends:

Recommendation 23

That the Government of Canada fund additional research into the prevalence of the

domestic diversion of firearms, including considering implementing a reasonable limit on

the number of restricted firearms a person can own should it be found to be a significant

factor in domestic diversion.

261

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Michael Spratt, Partner, Abergel Goldstein & Partners LLP, As an

Individual).

262

SECU, Evidence, 15 February 2022 (Wendy Cukier, President, Coalition for Gun Control).

263

For example, see SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Michael Spratt, Partner, Abergel Goldstein & Partners

LLP, As an Individual); SECU, Evidence, 15 February 2022 (Evelyn Fox, Founder, Communities for Zero

Violence).

264

SECU, Evidence, 17 February 2022 (Christian Pearce, Criminal Defence Counsel, Author, As an Individual).

265

SECU, Brief, Canadian Doctors for Protection from Guns, 27 February 2022.

266

SECU, Evidence, 17 February 2022 (Christian Pearce, Criminal Defence Counsel, Author, As an Individual).

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

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5.2.2 Ban on Assault-Style Weapons and Buyback Program

During the study, similar discussions to those that took place regarding a possible

handgun ban were held in relation to the ban on assault-style weapons currently

in place.

Indeed, several witnesses expressed doubts about the value of a ban on assault-style

weapons. Professor Langmann’s research questions the effectiveness of bans in reducing

gun violence.

267

Like other witnesses, he also questions the effectiveness based on the

fact that many firearms used to commit crimes are obtained illegally.

268

It should be

noted that Professor Langmann’s research did not consider the 2019 order in council.

Some witnesses felt that resources should be directed instead towards prevention,

intervention, education, law enforcement and border detection.

269

In addition, Matthew

Hipwell, President of Wolverine Supplies, mentioned that the definition of assault-style

weapons is not one that is “evidentiary-based.”

270

However, some witnesses believed that, in order to prevent gun violence, a ban on

assault-style weapons is warranted as their availability is a part of the problem. These

firearms, while they may start out as legal, can be diverted to the black market and, as

noted previously in relation to handguns, the threat they pose outweighs their utility.

271

As the Minister of Public Safety reminded the Committee, some of the banned assault-

style weapons were used “at École Polytechnique, at the Quebec City mosque and at

Dawson College.”

272

Moreover, he noted that “this type of weapon was designed with

one purpose in mind, and that is to kill people.”

273

The Minister specified the criteria

used to ban firearms, including “deadly force, the length of the barrel, the calibre of

267

SECU, Brief, Caillin Langmann, 8 February 2022.

268

Ibid.; SECU, Evidence, 15 February 2022 (Evelyn Fox, Founder, Communities for Zero Violence); SECU,

Evidence, 17 February 2022 (Matthew Hipwell, President, Wolverine Supplies).

269

SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Myron Demkiw, Deputy Chief, Toronto Police Service); SECU, Evidence,

15 February 2022 (Evelyn Fox, Founder, Communities for Zero Violence); SECU, Evidence, 17 February 2022

(Matthew Hipwell, President, Wolverine Supplies).

270

SECU, Evidence, 17 February 2022 (Mathew Hipwell, President, Wolverine Supplies).

271

For example, see SECU, Evidence, 15 February 2022 (Boufeldja Benabdallah, Spokesman, Centre culturel

islamique de Québec); (Heidi Rathjen, Coordinator, PolySeSouvient); (Wendy Cukier, President, Coalition for

Gun Control); SECU, Evidence, 17 February 2022 (Christian Pearce, Criminal Defence Counsel, Author, As an

Individual).

272

SECU, Evidence, 16 December 2021 (Hon. Marco Mendicino, Minister of Public Safety).

273

Ibid.

ammunition that a gun can hold, the number of rounds in a cartridge, and whether or

not it can be discharged within a certain period of time.”

274

Considering that assault-style weapons are dangerous and that their availability remains

problematic either through trafficking or diversion,

275

some witnesses noted that the

buyback program is urgently needed to prevent these firearms from falling into the

wrong hands:

276

“As long as the weapons are out there, the risk to public safety, that

there will be another mass shooting, exists.”

277

The Minister of Public Safety recognized

that addressing the root causes of gun violence is critical, and indicated that the buyback

program is only one part of the government’s strategy.

278

Chief Inspector Benoît Dubé from the Sûreté du Québec said that reducing gun violence

is a complicated issue that requires assessing many aspects, and he pointed out that the

buyback is “having an impact, but it’s definitely not the only solution to armed

violence.”

279

However, some witnesses noted that like banning handgun and assault-style weapons,

the buyback program would not be effective as it targets legal owners who have

registered firearms. Deputy Chief Myron Demkiw from the Toronto Police Service noted

for example that a buyback occurring in Toronto “may have made some tangible

difference in collecting guns that otherwise were unsafely stored”, however “when it

comes to the use of criminal handguns and the proliferation of handguns, that is not

where the successes came from.”

280

In their opinion, these legal firearms are not used

to commit crimes, and criminals won’t hand their firearms to the government.

281

274

SECU, Evidence, 1 March 2022 (Hon. Marco Mendicino, Minister of Public Safety).

275

SECU, Evidence, 17 February 2022 (Christian Pearce, Criminal Defence Counsel, Author, As an Individual).

276

For example, see SECU, Evidence, 15 February 2022 (Wendy Cukier, President, Coalition for Gun Control)

(Heidi Rathjen, Coordinator, PolySeSouvient); (Boufeldja Benabdallah, Spokesman, Centre culturel islamique

de Québec); SECU, Brief, Canadian Doctors for Protection from Guns, 27 February 2022.

277

SECU, Evidence, 15 February 2022 (Heidi Rathjen, Coordinator, PolySeSouvient).

278

SECU, Evidence, 1 March 2022 (Hon. Marco Mendicino, Minister of Public Safety).

279

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Benoît Dubé, Chief Inspector, Director Criminal Investigation, Sûreté

du Québec).

280

SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Myron Demkiw, Deputy Chief, Toronto Police Service).

281

For example, see SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Myron Demkiw, Deputy Chief, Toronto Police Service);

SECU, Evidence, 15 February 2022 (Evelyn Fox, Founder, Communities for Zero Violence); (Richard Miller,

Founder, Keep6ix); SECU, Evidence, 17 February 2022 (Keith Loh, President, Port Coquitlam & District

Hunting & Fishing Club).

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

AND GANG VIOLENCE IN CANADA

Moreover, in the view of these witnesses, the buyback program unjustly targets

legal owners:

[A] gun buyback of legal firearms that were used safely and legally for sporting and

hunting, such as [those] by our members, punishes those who already have to pass

screening, who already have to abide by laws against improper usage. […] The fact is,

gangsters are not using the $3,000 competition rifles that our members may lose in

a buyback.

282

Some witnesses, notably Maurice Sabourin, President of the Winnipeg Police

Association, indicated that the buyback program will be costly and that resources could

be better spent on, among other things, programs targeting the root causes of gun

violence, intervention, diverting youth from gangs, law enforcement, prosecution and

operations targeting the smuggling of illegal firearms at the border.

283

Finally, Brian

Sauvé from the National Police Federation stated, “[o]ur challenge with the buyback

program is that, once again, it’s increasing the mandate of an overstretched police

service that doesn't have enough boots on the ground to do what it’s doing today.”

284

After consideration of the evidence, the Committee recommends:

Recommendation 24

That the Government of Canada as part of its prohibition on certain firearms implement

a mandatory buyback program following consultation with relevant stakeholders.

5.2.3 International Experience

During the study, public policy options adopted by other jurisdictions to combat gun

violence were discussed. Although he noted that he has not conducted specific research

on this issue, Deputy Commissioner Stephen White of the RCMP underlined that

Canada’s unique geography needs to be considered when reviewing policy options from

other jurisdictions, noting for example “that the geography of New Zealand is very

different from Canada.”

285

282

SECU, Evidence, 17 February 2022 (Keith Loh, President, Port Coquitlam & District Hunting & Fishing Club).

283

For example, see SECU, Evidence, 3 February 2022 (Maurice Sabourin, President, Winnipeg Police

Association); SECU, Evidence, 15 February 2022 (Evelyn Fox, Founder, Communities for Zero Violence);

(Richard Miller, Founder, Keep6ix).

284

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Brian Sauvé, President, National Police Federation).

285

Ibid., (Stephen White, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized Policing Services, Royal Canadian Mounted Police).

More specifically, Wendy Cukier, President of the Coalition for Gun Control indicated

that Australia and the United Kingdom (U.K.) have implemented prohibitions on certain

firearms and introduced a buyback program and that [i]f you look at the successful

prohibitions in the U.K. and Australia, they were accompanied by buybacks.”

286

She further explained that although Canada, the U.K. and Australia have “about the

same rate per 100,000 of beatings, stabbings and other kinds of homicides,”

287

there is a

“profound difference” between them when it comes to gun violence. For example,

“[t]he U.K., which has twice as many people as Canada, last year had about 30 gun

murders. Canada had 277, the highest number we've seen in many years.”

288

She

indicated that the higher rates recorded in Canada can be explained by the fact that

Australia and the U.K. have put in place prohibitions on certain firearms and a buyback

program that have reduced the availability of firearms in their respective jurisdictions,

whereas in Canada, firearms remain available. As she noted, availability “increases the

likelihood people will die.”

289

In its brief to the Committee, Canadian Doctors for

Protection from Guns also pointed out that since the implementation of stricter gun

control in Australia and the U.K., no school shootings or mass shootings have occurred in

these countries.

290

However, Professor Caillin Langmann stated that recent Australian research

demonstrates “no statistically significant association between Australian firearms

legislation and firearms homicide reduction from 1979 to 2013.”

291

Firearms homicides

had already been on a downward trend.

After consideration of the evidence, the Committee recommends:

Recommendation 25

That the Government of Canada study models adopted by other jurisdictions, like the

United Kingdom and Australia, in banning certain firearms in their jurisdictions in order

to better understand what a made-in-Canada solution would look like.

286

SECU, Evidence, 15 February 2022 (Wendy Cukier, President, Coalition for Gun Control).

287

Ibid.

288

Ibid.; See also SECU, Brief, Canadian Doctors for Protection from Guns, 27 February 2022.

289

SECU, Evidence, 15 February 2022 (Wendy Cukier, President, Coalition for Gun Control).

290

SECU, Brief, Canadian Doctors for Protection from Guns, 27 February 2022.

291

SECU, Brief, Caillin Langmann, 8 February 2022.

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

AND GANG VIOLENCE IN CANADA

5.3 High-Capacity Magazines and Ammunition

As mentioned in Chapter 2, the use and availability of prohibited high-capacity

magazines and the availability of ammunition constitute a worrying trend that has been

flagged by several witnesses.

292

Some witnesses reported to the Committee an increase

in the number of seizures of overcapacity magazines and in the number of shell casings

collected at shootings.

293

As previously noted, this was believed to be “a reflection of the

access to more ammunition and high-capacity magazines.”

294

As indicated by Kellie

Paquette from the Canadian Firearms Program, a licence is not required to buy a

magazine for a firearm or to possess ammunition, but a licence is required to buy

ammunition.

295

With regard to the availability of ammunition, Michael Duheme, RCMP

Deputy Commissioner of Federal Policing, noted that it is difficult to control the amount

of ammunition people may be buying, as people may “buy a box of ammo here, a box of

ammo there, and eventually it starts building up.”

296

As noted by Matthew Hipwell from Wolverine Supplies, “high-capacity magazines were

banned back in 1993.”

297

Indeed, currently, high-capacity magazines are illegal in Canada

if they exceed the maximum permitted capacity prescribed by law, unless they have

been permanently altered to hold no more than the legal limit.

298

As a general rule, the

maximum legal capacity of magazines for semi-automatic firearms is five cartridges, and

for most handguns it is 10 cartridges.

299

292

For example, see SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Michael Rowe, Staff Sergeant, Vancouver Police

Department); Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Myron Demkiw, Deputy Chief, Toronto Police Service); Royal

Canadian Mounted Police, Maximum permitted magazine capacity; SECU, Evidence, 15 February 2022 (Heidi

Rathjen, Coordinator, PolySeSouvient).

293

SECU, Evidence, 8 February 2022 (Myron Demkiw, Deputy Chief, Toronto Police Service); SECU, Evidence,

10 February 2022 (Michael Rowe, Staff Sergeant, Vancouver Police Department).

294

Ibid. The CBSA and RCMP have also reported seizures of magazines and ammunition. See, for example,

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Michael Duheme, Deputy Commissioner, Federal Policing, Royal Canadian

Mounted Police); (Stephen White, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized Policing Services, Royal Canadian

Mounted Police); (Scott Harris, Vice-President, Intelligence and Enforcement Branch, Canada Border

Services Agency).

295

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Kellie Paquette, Director General, Canadian Firearms Program, Royal

Canadian Mounted Police).

296

Ibid., (Michael Duheme, Deputy Commissioner, Federal Policing, Royal Canadian Mounted Police).

297

SECU, Evidence, 17 February 2022 (Matthew Hipwell, President, Wolverine Supplies).

298

Regulations Prescribing Certain Firearms and other Weapons, Components and Parts of Weapons,

Accessories, Cartridge Magazines, Ammunition and Projectiles as Prohibited or Restricted, (SOR/98-462).

299

Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Maximum permitted magazine capacity; SECU, Evidence, 15 February 2022

(Heidi Rathjen, Coordinator, PolySeSouvient).

During the study, some witnesses identified flaws in the current legislation that need to

be addressed because of the serious risks ammunition and magazines present.

300

The Canadian Doctors for Protection from Guns express their opinion to the Committee

that restrictions on the amount of ammunition that can be possessed by individuals

should be imposed.

301

Heidi Rathjen, Coordinator of PolySeSouvient, stressed that it is currently legal to

possess a high-capacity magazine, which could normally hold, for example, “20, 30, 50 or

even 100 bullets,”

302

if it has been permanently altered to hold no more than the legal

limit. Some witnesses explained that it is easy to restore an altered magazine to its full

illegal capacity.

303

As described by Staff Sergeant Michael Rowe from the Vancouver

Police Department:

The current practice to limit capacity on a magazine is that people will often insert a

rivet in the back of the magazine that prevents the follower—the small piece that

follows the rounds—from progressing lower and taking a higher capacity. Often we'll

look for this rivet. You can often see on magazines where the capacity has been

expanded that this rivet is simply drilled out. Therefore, it’s not a permanent alteration.

It’s very easily defeated.

304

Heidi Rathjen reminded the Committee that many mass murderers “had all legally

purchased modifiable magazines and removed the screw to use the full capacity of

the weapon.”

305

Bill C-21, An Act to amend certain Acts and to make certain consequential amendments

(firearms), which was introduced February 2021 but died in the Order Paper, included a

provision that would have made it a hybrid offence to alter a cartridge magazine that is

not prohibited to exceed its lawful capacity, i.e., to alter it in such a way as to make it

prohibited.

306

That being said, the Minister of Public Safety’s mandate letter included the

300

SECU, Brief, Canadian Doctors for Protection from Guns, 27 February 2022; SECU, Evidence, 15 February

2022 (Heidi Rathjen, Coordinator, PolySeSouvient).

301

SECU, Brief, Canadian Doctors for Protection from Guns, 27 February 2022.

302

SECU, Evidence, 15 February 2022 (Heidi Rathjen, Coordinator, PolySeSouvient).

303

For example, see SECU, Evidence, 15 February 2022 (Heidi Rathjen, Coordinator, PolySeSouvient); SECU,

Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Michael Rowe, Staff Sergeant, Vancouver Police Department); SECU, Evidence,

17 February 2022 (Matthew Hipwell, President, Wolverine Supplies).

304

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Michael Rowe, Staff Sergeant, Vancouver Police Department).

305

SECU, Evidence, 15 February 2022 (Heidi Rathjen, Coordinator, PolySeSouvient).

306

Bill C-21, An Act to amend certain Acts and to make certain consequential amendments (firearms),

Parliament, 2

Session, clause 2.

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

AND GANG VIOLENCE IN CANADA

following two commitments: “requiring the permanent alteration of long-gun magazines

so that they can never hold more than five rounds”

307

and “banning the sale or transfer

of magazines capable of holding more than the legal number of bullets.”

308

According to Heidi Rathjen, the penalty that was proposed in Bill C-21 was not sufficient

“to stop someone who’s about to commit mass murder from modifying a magazine.”

309

She recommended that all magazines “be limited to five bullets” and explained that the

firearms industry “is perfectly capable of producing magazines that have five bullets and

not more.”

310

Similarly, Staff Sergeant Michael Rowe from the Vancouver Police

Department indicated that he would “certainly support the outright ban of high-capacity

magazines” and stated that such a ban “is very important to law enforcement.”

311

RCMP

Commissioner Brenda Lucki informed the Committee that she was also in favour of such

a ban.

312

Consequently, the Committee recommends:

Recommendation 26

That the Government of Canada review the importation, domestic manufacturing, sale,

and possession of all firearms magazines that can be easily modified to hold more than

the maximum permitted capacity.

Recommendation 27

That the Government of Canada amend current legislation to require a possession and

acquisition license to purchase magazines in the same way as ammunition.

307

Prime Minister of Canada, Minister of Public Safety Mandate Letter, 16 December 2021.

308

Prime Minister of Canada, Minister of Public Safety Mandate Letter, 16 December 2021. The Minister of

Public Safety also indicated during the study that they are looking “at creating new laws to prohibit the

alteration of magazines which would allow for a greater number than is permissible.” See SECU, Evidence,

1 March 2022 (Hon. Marco Mendicino, Minister of Public Safety).

309

SECU, Evidence, 15 February 2022 (Heidi Rathjen, Coordinator, PolySeSouvient).

310

Ibid.

311

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Michael Rowe, Staff Sergeant, Vancouver Police Department).

312

SECU, Evidence, 16 December 2021 (Brenda Lucki, Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police).

5.4 Illegally Made Firearms

As previously noted, in some provinces, the use of firearms that are illegally

manufactured and not easily traceable – also known as “ghost guns” – is a worrying

trend for a number of law enforcement agencies who participated in this study. As Staff

Sergeant Michael Rowe explained:

Ghost guns can be 3-D printed or modified from what’s called a Polymer80 handgun.

Specific styles of high-quality airsoft handguns can also be easily converted into fully

functioning firearms. Ghost guns can also be composed of multiple parts from other

firearms, resulting in a firearm that has multiple serial numbers on it.

313

5.4.1 Importation of Gun Parts

Some witnesses signalled to the Committee that the importation of firearm parts to

produce ghost guns is a disturbing trend that needs to be addressed.

314

In fact, according

to these witnesses, imports of different legal and prohibited firearm parts, such as

barrels, slides, trigger assemblies, magazines, silencers and suppressors, in particular

from the U.S., have been observed in many parts of the country.

315

When firearm parts

are being purchased, imported or possessed in bulk, it is an indicator of

manufacturing.

316

In addition, “[s]ome individuals are illegally importing gun frames

from companies like Polymer80, and then modifying them with parts they get delivered

through the Canadian postal service.”

317

313

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Michael Rowe, Staff Sergeant, Vancouver Police Department).

314

For example, see SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Michael Rowe, Staff Sergeant, Vancouver Police

Department); SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Michael Duheme, Deputy Commissioner, Federal Policing,

Royal Canadian Mounted Police); SECU, Evidence, 17 February 2022 (David Bertrand, Chief Inspector,

Criminal Investigative Services, Service de police de la Ville de Montréal).

315

For example, see SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Michael Duheme, Deputy Commissioner, Federal

Policing, Royal Canadian Mounted Police); SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Michael Rowe, Staff Sergeant,

Vancouver Police Department); SECU, Brief, Vancouver Police Service, 15 February 2015.

316

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Michael Rowe, Staff Sergeant, Vancouver Police Department).

317

SECU, Evidence, 17 February 2022 (David Bertrand, Chief Inspector, Criminal Investigative Services, Service

de police de la Ville de Montréal).

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

AND GANG VIOLENCE IN CANADA

Chief Inspector Benoît Dubé from the Sûreté du Québec clarified that current legislation

“does not allow us to search or seize firearms parts at Canada Post.”

318

This impedes the

police’s capacity to conduct investigations.

319

As several witnesses explained, apart from the receiver, which is regulated,

320

“a

firearms part on its own is legal. It’s only when parts are assembled that the weapon

becomes illegal.”

321

Consequently, some witnesses recommended to the Committee that current legislation

be amended to regulate the import, purchase, possession and circulation of firearm

parts.

322

Staff Sergeant Michael Rowe from the Vancouver Police Department made

specific recommendations to this effect in a brief presented to the Committee.

323

The

National Police Federation also recommended “[exploring] language expansion of

criminal code offences in reference to manufacturing and assembly to contribute to

tackling the issue of ghost guns.”

324

Of note, on 1 March 2022, the Minister of Public Safety specified that his government is

contemplating legislation to address the issues regarding gun parts.

I will say that the legislation we are actively contemplating does seek to address the very

issue you have put your finger on. We need to be sure that we send a very clear

message to those who would try to alter cartridges, and to those who would try to use

different components to increase the deadly force that guns can carry out with

devastating effect, that this is unlawful, and if they break the law there will be serious

consequences.

318

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Benoît Dubé, Chief Inspector, Director Criminal Investigation, Sûreté

du Québec).

319

Ibid.; (Michael Rowe, Staff Sergeant, Vancouver Police Department).

320

Ibid., (Solomon Friedman, Criminal Defence Lawyer, As an Individual); SECU, Brief, Vancouver Police Service,

15 February 2022.

321

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Benoît Dubé, Chief Inspector, Director Criminal Investigation, Sûreté

du Québec).

322

SECU, Evidence, 17 February 2022 (David Bertrand, Chief Inspector, Criminal Investigative Services,

Service de police de la Ville de Montréal); SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Michael Rowe, Staff Sergeant,

Vancouver Police Department); (Benoît Dubé, Chief Inspector, Director Criminal Investigation, Sûreté

du Québec); SECU, Evidence, 16 December 2021 (Brenda Lucki, Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted

Police).

323

SECU, Brief, Vancouver Police Service, 15 February 2022.

324

SECU, Brief, National Police Federation, February 2022, p. 7.

We plan to give law enforcement all of the tools they need to ensure that those new

laws are able to be enforced once they're on the books.

325

On another note, the question of when the “collection of parts become a firearm”

326

was raised by witnesses, with some noting that the matter needs “to be examined in the

context of the [Criminal] code and the Firearms Act regulations.”

327

Criminal defence

lawyer Solomon Friedman argued that we need to ensure that “only licensed,

background-checked and pre-screened individuals have the ability to possess not only

completed firearms, but also potential firearms in whatever form.”

328

5.4.2 Ghost Guns

Some witnesses warned the Committee that there is an increase of firearms parts that

are being produced with 3-D printers, including silencers and high-capacity magazines,

which are used to manufacture ghost guns.

329

In fact, the Committee learned that

“modern 3-D printing materials can produce a durable firearm, capable of shooting

hundreds of rounds without a failure.”

330

The Committee was told that these printers are affordable as they “can be purchased

lawfully from a variety of stores for as little as $300,”

331

and “the cost of the materials

used to produce the firearms, the plastic material that is fed into the printer, can work

out to literally dollars per firearm produced.”

332

These printers are unregulated in Canada.

333

To target people using the 3-D printed

receivers into functioning guns, Staff Sergeant Michael Rowe from the Vancouver Police

Department suggested that the regulation of firearm parts would be required:

325

SECU, Evidence, 1 March 2022 (Hon. Marco Mendicino, Minister of Public Safety).

326

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Solomon Friedman, Criminal Defence Lawyer, As an Individual).

327

Ibid.

328

Ibid.

329

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Michael Duheme, Deputy Commissioner, Federal Policing, Royal Canadian

Mounted Police); SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Michael Rowe, Staff Sergeant, Vancouver Police

Department).

330

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Michael Rowe, Staff Sergeant, Vancouver Police Department).

331

Ibid.

332

Ibid.

333

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Michael Duheme, Deputy Commissioner, Federal Policing, Royal Canadian

Mounted Police).

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

AND GANG VIOLENCE IN CANADA

Each 3-D printed receiver, the component they can 3-D print, requires specific parts to

turn it into a functioning firearm, such as a trigger assembly, a barrel, a slide and rails,

the metal pieces that go inside it. If we're able to regulate the sale, possession and

importation of these specific parts, that would allow us to more effectively target

people who are putting together the 3-D printed receivers into the functioning guns.

334

After careful consideration of the evidence, the Committee recommends:

Recommendation 28

That the Government of Canada regulate the possession, sale, and import of firearm

component parts such as barrels, slides, and trigger assemblies.

Recommendation 29

That the Government of Canada further investigate the prevalence of, and develop a

strategy to counteract the manufacturing of illegal firearms or ghost guns.

Recommendation 30

That the Government of Canada amend the definition of a firearm in Section 2 of the

Criminal Code to include in its specification of firearms and firearm parts “blank castings

of frames or receivers not yet capable of holding various firing components.”

5.5 Verification of Licences When Transferring a Non-Restricted

Firearm

Bill C-71, An Act to amend certain Acts and Regulations in relation to firearms,

335

which

received Royal Assent in June 2019, amended the Firearms Act and Criminal Code,

among other matters, to require that the seller of a non-restricted firearm “verify that

the person they are selling to has a valid firearms licence.”

336

This includes validating the

photo and information on the licence.

337

As explained by Kellie Paquette from Canadian

Firearms Program, the RCMP does not have a role in verifying that the seller did a

correct verification of the licence: “At this point it would be based on that seller being

334

SECU, Evidence, 10 February 2022 (Michael Rowe, Staff Sergeant, Vancouver Police Department).

335

Bill C-71, An Act to amend certain Acts and Regulations in relation to firearms, 42

Parliament, 1

Session.

336

SECU, Evidence, 1 February 2022 (Stephen White, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized Policing Services, Royal

Canadian Mounted Police).

337

Ibid.

responsible for that visual inspection of the licence.”

338

Once the seller is satisfied, the

seller is “then […] responsible for submitting a request to the registrar for a licence

verification number.”

339

Such a process does not provide enough safety, according to Heidi Rathjen from

PolySeSouvient:

Running the licence number through the system is the only way to ensure that a licence

is not counterfeit, stolen or revoked. A seller cannot check that themselves, and yet the

regulations tabled last June require no such thing. According to the proposed

regulations, once they check the photo on the buyer’s licence, sellers will have to

contact the RCMP to obtain a reference number authorizing the transfer. However,

there is no obligation for a seller to provide any information whatsoever related to the

buyer’s licence to the RCMP, and there is no obligation stated anywhere in the laws and

regulations that the RCMP has to run the licence number through the system.

340

In a written response provided to the Committee about the licence verification system

established under Bill C-71, the RCMP gave the following details:

On coming into force of the C-71 amendments to section 23.1 of the Firearms

Act the transferor (seller) of a non-restricted firearm must first apply to the

Registrar for a reference number.

In order to issue a reference number, the Registrar must be satisfied that the

transferee (the buyer) holds, and is still eligible to hold, a licence authorizing

the transferee to acquire and possess non-restricted firearms. Consequently,

the Registrar will require a transferor requesting a reference number to

provide the transferee’s licence number, and any additional information on

the firearms licence card that the Registrar may need in order to conduct the

necessary licence check and may include: the transferee’s full name, date of

birth, height, gender, and/or eye colour.

In applying for a reference number, a transferor must also confirm with the

Registrar that they have taken reasonable steps, as described in the

regulations, to confirm that the transferee and the individual depicted on the

firearms licence presented by the transferee are the same person.

338

Ibid., (Kellie Paquette, Director General, Canadian Firearms Program, Royal Canadian Mounted Police).

339

Ibid.

340

SECU, Evidence, 15 February 2022 (Heidi Rathjen, Coordinator, PolySeSouvient).

A PATH FORWARD: REDUCING GUN

AND GANG VIOLENCE IN CANADA

[…]

Currently, section 23.1 of the Firearms Act states the transferor (seller) may

request that the Registrar inform the transferor as to whether the transferee

(buyer) holds, and is still eligible to hold, a firearms licence for the acquisition

of a non-restricted firearm.

On coming into force of the C-71 amendments to section 23.1 of the Firearms

Act, the transferor must first apply to the Registrar for a reference number. In

order to issue a reference number, the Registrar must be satisfied that the

transferee holds, and is still eligible to hold, a licence authorizing the

transferee to acquire and possess a non-restricted firearm. Anyone found

transferring a non-restricted firearm without having first obtained a reference

number would be liable to charges under sections 99 and 101 of the

Criminal Code.

341

In light of these considerations, the Committee recommends:

Recommendation 31

That the Royal Canadian Mounted Police ensure that the Chief Firearms Officer verify all

information contained in a possession and acquisition license application.

Recommendation 32

That the Government of Canada, amend licensing regulations to clarify the licence

verification provisions by stating that a seller must provide a potential buyer's licence

number to the Registrar so that it can confirm its validity in the system before issuing a

reference number authorizing the transfer of a firearm.

Recommendation 33

That the Government of Canada amend the law to ensure that individuals under a

protection order related to intimate partner violence automatically have their possession

and acquisition licence revoked and their firearms surrendered to the Crown.

341

Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Written response to the Committee, February 2022.

CONCLUSION

During the Committee’s study, witnesses were unanimous: combatting gun and gang

violence requires engaging all stakeholders including all levels of government, civil

society, law enforcement agencies, social services, grassroots organizations, Indigenous

peoples and local communities. In addition, addressing the underlying causes of gun and

gang violence, preventing youth from engaging in such violence and assisting individuals

involved in gang activities to exit this lifestyle are key components in the fight against

gun and gang violence.

The Committee shares the concerns expressed by witnesses from different parts of

Canada, and values the expertise and time they provided. The Committee wishes to

highlight their valuable contribution to finding solutions to combat gun and

gang violence.

The Committee drew upon the evidence it received to formulate key findings and

recommendations aimed at strengthening Canada’s efforts to tackle the problem of gun

and gang violence. With this report, the Committee intends to send a clear message that

gun and gang violence needs to be urgently addressed. It firmly believes that the

implementation of the recommendations that are formulated in this report will assist all

stakeholders in preventing gun and gang violence and make it possible to correct the

gaps that were brought to its attention during our study.

Therefore, the Committee recommends:

Recommendation 34

That the Government of Canada introduce legislation as soon as possible that take into

account the recommendations of this report.

APPENDIX A

LIST OF WITNESSES

The following table lists the witnesses who appeared before the committee at its

meetings related to this report. Transcripts of all public meetings related to this report

are available on the committee’s webpage for this study.

Organizations and Individuals

Date

Meeting

Canada Border Services Agency

Scott Harris, Vice-President

Intelligence and Enforcement Branch

John Ossowski, President

2021/12/16

Department of Public Safety and Emergency

Preparedness

Talal Dakalbab, Assistant Deputy Minister

Crime Prevention Branch

Hon. Marco Mendicino, P.C., M.P., Minister of Public Safety

Rob Stewart, Deputy Minister

2021/12/16

Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Mathieu Bertrand, Director

Federal Policing Criminal Operations

D/Commr Michael Duheme

Federal Policing

Commr Brenda Lucki

Kellie Paquette, Director General

Canadian Firearms Program

D/Commr Stephen White

Specialized Policing Services

2021/12/16

Canada Border Services Agency

Fred Gaspar, Vice-President

Commercial and Trade Branch

Scott Harris, Vice-President

Intelligence and Enforcement Branch

2022/02/01

Customs and Immigration Union

Mark Weber, National President

2022/02/01

Organizations and Individuals

Date

Meeting

National Police Federation

Brian Sauvé, President

2022/02/01

Royal Canadian Mounted Police

A/Commr Michel Arcand

Federal Policing Criminal Operations

D/Commr Michael Duheme

Federal Policing

Don Halina, Director General

National Forensic Laboratory Services

Kellie Paquette, Director General

Canadian Firearms Program

D/Commr Stephen White

Specialized Policing Services

2022/02/01

Akwesasne Mohawk Police Service

Chief Shawn Dulude

2022/02/03

As an individual

Mitch Bourbonniere, Outreach Worker

Ogijiita Pimatiswin Kinamatawin

2022/02/03

Bear Clan Patrol Inc.

Kevin Walker, Interim Executive Director

2022/02/03

Mohawk Council of Akwesasne

Chief April Adams-Phillips

Grand Chief Abram Benedict

2022/02/03

Native Counselling Services of Alberta

Marlene Orr, Chief Executive Officer

Nicole Whiskeyjack, Community Coordinator

2022/02/03

Winnipeg Police Association

Det Philip Neyron

Maurice Sabourin, President

2022/02/03

Organizations and Individuals

Date

Meeting

As an individual

Robert Henry, Assistant Professor

Department of Indigenous Studies, University of

Saskatchewan

Caillin Langmann, Assistant Clinical Professor

Department of Medicine, McMaster University

2022/02/08

Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police

Chief Evan Bray

2022/02/08

Edmonton Police Service

Chief Dale McFee

2022/02/08

STR8 UP: 10,000 Little Steps to Healing Inc.

Stan Tu’Inukuafe, Co-Founder

2022/02/08

Toronto Police Service

D/Chief Myron Demkiw

S/Supt Lauren Pogue

2022/02/08

As an individual

Solomon Friedman, Criminal Defence Lawyer

Michael Spratt, Criminal and Appeal Lawyer

Abergel Goldstein & Partners LLP

2022/02/10

Service de police de l’agglomération de Longueuil

Fady Dagher, Director

2022/02/10

Statistics Canada

Jeff Latimer, Director General

Health, Justice, Diversity and Populations

Lucie Léonard, Director

Canadian Centre for Justice and Community Safety

Statistics

2022/02/10

Sûreté du Québec

Benoît Dubé, Chief Inspector

Director Criminal Investigation

2022/02/10

Vancouver Police Department

S/Sgt Michael Rowe

2022/02/10

Centre culturel islamique de Québec

Boufeldja Benabdallah, Spokesman

2022/02/15

Organizations and Individuals

Date

Meeting

Coalition for Gun Control

Wendy Cukier, President

2022/02/15

Communities for Zero Violence

Evelyn Fox, Founder

2022/02/15

Keep6ix

Richard Miller, Founder

2022/02/15

One By One Movement Inc.

Marcell Wilson, Founder

2022/02/15

PolySeSouvient

Heidi Rathjen, Coordinator

2022/02/15

As an individual

Christian Pearce, Criminal Defence Counsel, Author

2022/02/17

Port Coquitlam & District Hunting & Fishing Club

Keith Loh, President

2022/02/17

Service de police de la Ville de Montréal

David Bertrand, Chief Inspector

Criminal Investigative Services

2022/02/17

Wolverine Supplies

Matthew Hipwell, President

2022/02/17

Canada Border Services Agency

Scott Harris, Vice-President

Intelligence and Enforcement Branch

John Ossowski, President

2022/03/01

Department of Public Safety and Emergency

Preparedness

Talal Dakalbab, Assistant Deputy Minister

Community Safety and Countering Crime

Hon. Marco Mendicino, P.C., M.P., Minister of Public Safety

2022/03/01

Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Commr Brenda Lucki

D/Commr Stephen White

Specialized Policing Services

2022/03/01

APPENDIX B

LIST OF BRIEFS

The following is an alphabetical list of organizations and individuals who submitted briefs

to the committee related to this report. For more information, please consult the

committee’s webpage for this study.

Canadian Doctors for Protection from Guns

Langmann, Caillin

Liberty For Youth

National Coalition Against Contraband Tobacco

National Police Federation

Statistics Canada

Vancouver Police Department

REQUEST FOR GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Pursuant to Standing Order 109, the committee requests that the government table a

comprehensive response to this Report.

A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings (Meetings Nos. 3 to 9, 11, 13 to 16

and 18) is tabled.

Respectfully submitted,

Hon. Jim Carr, P.C., M.P.

Chair

Safer Communities: Focusing Resources Where They Make a Difference

Introduction

This report has been drafted by Conservative Members of the Standing Committee on

Public Safety and National Security to supplement the report by the committee entitled A Path

Forward: Reducing Gun and Gang Violence. This comprehensive study reviewed the causes and

contributing factors of gun violence, as well as analyzed the policing tactics, legal ramifications,

and societal impacts. The final report contains a wealth of recommendations, many of which

are supported by members of all parties.

However, a small number of recommendations were made that did not align with

important evidence presented to the committee. Specifically, the recommendation to

implement a mandatory buyback of firearms prohibited under the Government of Canada’s

May 2020 Order-in-Council (and subsequent additions to the Order-In-Council) and the

Government of Canada’s proposed provincial handgun ban, did not receive adequate support

from witness testimony to warrant a recommendation to government to continue

implementation of these initiatives.

Further, the committee heard the significant taxpayer resources to fund the buyback

and handgun ban would have a greater impact in reducing gun violence in Canada if those

resources were redirected to anti-gun smuggling operations at the US-Canada border,

increasing police services, and to youth and young adult gang prevention and diversion

programs.

Additionally, the committee heard that the government’s Bill C-5 An Act to amend the

Criminal Code and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, which will end mandatory

minimum sentencing for those convicted of violent crime involving firearms, would have a

negative impact on reducing gun violence.

Recommendation 1

That the Government of Canada revoke the May 2020 Order-in-Council firearms prohibition,

discard the mandatory firearms buyback program, and abandon the proposed provincial

handgun ban.

The committee heard considerable expert testimony including from law enforcement,

academia, and grassroots community organizations that disputed the efficacy and feasibility of

the government’s proposed mandatory firearms buyback program and proposed provincial

handgun ban. Importantly, the committee heard that gun violence is primarily a result of gang

and criminal activity, not law-abiding firearms owners, and as a result, efforts to combat gun

violence should be targeted accordingly.

The committee heard that approximately 80 percent of the firearms used in violent

crime in Toronto are illegally smuggled from the United States. For example, Deputy Chief of

the Toronto Police Service Myron Demkiw explained,

the City of Toronto's experience is that guns are not from law abiding citizens that are being used

in crime. They're guns being smuggled from the United States. Those engaged in handling those

firearms are not law abiding, licensed gun owners; they are criminals with no firearms license.

Further, Marcell Wilson, Founder and President of the One-by-One Movement Inc., an

organization founded by former gang members, extremists and organized crime members to

help identify, address, and research strategies on effective social programming for youth

outreach, explained, “when speaking on gun control, when we hear the phrase, it should always

by synonymous with illegal gun crime and illegal gun trafficking as over 80% of the gun violence

we [witnesses is] committed with illegal firearms smuggled in from the USA.”

Evelyn Fox, founder of Communities for Zero Violence, a group founded by a mother of

teenaged son killed by gun violence that seeks to create and expand awareness of the violence

crisis in Toronto and the GTA, stated, “all the community-level violence is being committed by

those who are not licensed to possess or use [guns].”

Additionally, the committee heard from multiple police experts and grassroots

community organizations that it is highly unlikely any criminal who illegally obtained and owns

a firearm would participate in, or be affected by, any firearm bans. As a result, a buyback

program or handgun ban is not likely to take any of these illegally obtained firearms out of the

hands of criminals and as a result, will not have a significant impact on reducing gun violence,

while costing taxpayers billions of dollars.

For example, Chief Evan Bray, Co-Chair of the Firearms Special Purpose Committee of

the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, stated that, “a ban is only as good as the people

who are willing to follow it. I said to Chief McFee [Chief of police, Edmonton Police Service] that

we have a ban on murders in Canada and yet, sadly, we still have homicides happening all the

time.”

Kevin Walker, Interim Director of the Bear Clan Patrol, a grassroots Indigenous-led

community safety organization in Winnipeg, stated, “I think the people that are using the

weapons, criminally, won't be turning them in to anyone any time soon.”

Dr. Caillin Langmann, an Emergency Room Medical Doctor, assistant clinical professor at

McMaster University, and leading researcher in Canada on the impact of government gun

control measures of licensed firearm owners on gun violence prevalence, who has written

several peer-reviewed sociological studies on this issue, shared with the committee that,

No statistically significant beneficial associations were found between firearms

legislation and homicide by firearms, as well as spousal homicide and a criminal charge

of discharge of firearm with intent. Bans of military-appearing firearms, semi-automatic

rifles and handguns, short-barreled handguns, and Saturday night specials in the 1990s

has resulted in no associated reduction in homicide rates.

Recommendation 2

That the taxpayer resources allocated to administering the mandatory prohibited firearms

buyback program and proposed provincial handgun ban be reallocated to target anti-gun

smuggling operations at the US-Canada border, increasing police services, and to youth and

young adult prevention and diversion programs.

It is estimated the buyback program could cost the taxpayer upwards of three billion

dollars, and the Government of Canada has said it will provide an additional billion dollars to

implement a proposed provincial handgun ban. Committee witnesses repeatedly spoke in

favour of redirecting the resources for the buyback and proposed handgun ban towards more

impactful areas to reduce gun violence, such as increasing anti-smuggling operations at the

Canada-US border, increasing resources to police services, and funding youth and young adult

gang prevention and diversion programs.

Further, the committee heard from witnesses that the Canada Border Services Agency

has limited resources to combat anti-gun smuggling operations. For example, Mark Weber,

President of the Customs and Immigration Union of the Canada Border Service Agency,

explained CBSA Officers face significant challenges in protecting Canada’s border with the

United States, which is the longest undefended border between countries in the world. Mr.

Weber stated, “not only is Canada’s ability to prevent smuggling lacking, but its capacity to

gather reliable and sound data is also inadequate,” and, “there is an almost 0% chance that any

illegal weapon entering the country via rail will ever be found.”

Police authorities from across Canada testified that their resources are stretched thin

and there are significant challenges to keep pace with the growing gang violence and drug

trafficking issues in Canada that contribute to gun violence. Recruitment and retention of police

officers and lack of sufficient resources impact the ability of police to respond to calls for

service and the capacity to undertake preventative policing measures. As a result, police

services are experiencing burnout and fatigue. These issues contribute to the challenges of the

vital role police services have in reducing gun violence in Canada.

Accordingly, the committee heard from police that diverting limited police resources to

implement an ineffective firearm buyback program will only exacerbate the pressure on police

services and impact their ability to focus on reducing gang activity that causes most gun

violence in Canada. Police witnesses at committee repeatedly stated the billions of taxpayer

dollars that will be spent on the government’s firearm buyback program would have a greater

impact on reducing gun violence if those resources were directed to increasing police services

for more officer recruitment, technology and equipment upgrades, and community outreach.

For example, Brian Sauvé, President of the National Police Federation explained, “Our

challenges with the buyback program is once again increasing the mandate of an overstretched

police service that doesn't have enough boots on the ground to do what it's doing today.”

The committee consistently heard that youth and young adult gang prevention and

diversion programs that create supportive and positive environments at the community level

with culturally appropriate outreach, can effectively divert youth from joining gangs at a young

age. The committee heard if a youth can be diverted, the likelihood of leading a life of crime

and contributing to gun violence is significantly reduced. Currently these programs are

extraordinarily underfunded.

For example, the Winnipeg Police Service has only one full-time employee carrying out

this work and Maurice Sabourin, President of the Winnipeg Police Association, explained that

his force, “could use more resources on the street and also more resources for social

programming, because if we can get to those kids early, that prevents them from entering a

gang or continuing to be involved in a gang. I believe that funding for that buyback program

should be diverted to those social programs.”

Community groups like the Bear Clan, the One by One Movement Inc., and Communities

for Zero Violence, agreed taxpayer resources spent on gun buybacks and bans would have little

impact on reducing gun violence and rather, those resources would make a significant

difference in reducing gun violence if they were used to support at-risk youth at the grassroots

community level.

For example, Mr. Wilson explained, “We are definitely not seeing enough resources going

into preventative measures. As we all know, common sense, deductive reasoning and

prevention is a lot cheaper for the taxpaying citizen than intervention.”

Ms. Fox explained, “every instance of violence has an intervention point that has been

overlooked or not been acted upon by either people closest to that person, service providers,

or those in positions of power whose job it is to intervene,” and, “we have traumatized

communities that are never able to heal due to the continued occurrences of violence and the

lack of resources to provide them support,” and, “we hardly have any services that cater to

community violence…It’s very difficult to find resources that are culturally specific.”

Recommendation 3

That the Government of Canada withdraw Bill C-5 An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the

Controlled Drugs and Substances Act that seeks to eliminate mandatory minimum sentences

for those convicted of serious firearm crime and allow the mandatory minimum penalties for

these egregious crimes to remain in place.

A Path Forward makes no recommendation regarding the Government of Canada’s

pending repeal of mandatory minimum sentences for several serious firearm crimes, including

robbery and extortion with a firearm, and firing a firearm with intent to injure, despite multiple

witnesses making the case that these sentences should remain in place to keep violent

criminals out of communities. Given the task of the committee was to study how best to reduce

gun violence in Canada, it is incongruous that A Path Forward fails to make recommendations

to the Government of Canada pertaining to the legitimate concerns that criminals who commit

violent crimes with guns will not face mandatory prison time and be removed from public

society as a result, following the anticipated passage of Bill C-5.

For example, Mr. Sabourin expressed serious concerns,

With the introduction of Bill C-5 and the proposal to remove minimum sentencing, I fear that's

going to have a negative effect on public safety here in Winnipeg. As a member of our property

crimes unit and our stolen auto unit, I saw the benefits of intensive supervision as well as

incarceration and members of the criminal element being placed in incarceration and in remand.

Chief Inspector David Bertrand from the Service de police de la Ville de Montréal (SPVM)

suggested, “discussions about minimum sentences in certain gun usage and possession

situations should be brought back to the forefront.” Further, Matthew Hipwell, an RCMP

veteran, was concerned that by reducing mandatory minimum penalties, “we are failing to hold

people and individuals accountable for their actions.”

Conclusion

This supplementary report diverges from A Path Forward on the above mentioned

recommendations, which Conservative Members of the committee believe are critical to

reducing gun violence in Canada. These recommendations provide a more fulsome reflection of

committee testimony from expert witnesses and the realities and challenges of reducing gun

violence in Canada.

The evidence is clear: the taxpayer resources earmarked for a mandatory firearm

buyback program and proposed provincial handgun ban will not be effective in reducing gun

violence because it fails to target the real issue—gang and criminal activity. Instead, taxpayer

resources should be redirected to anti-gun smuggling operations at the Canada-US border,

increasing police services, and to youth and young adult gang prevention and diversion

programs. Properly resourcing these three key areas will have a much greater impact on

reducing gun violence in Canada than ineffective gun buybacks and bans.

We hope that the Government of Canada will act swiftly to implement the

recommendations contained in this supplementary report.

Bloc Québécois supplementary report regarding the study on gun control, illegal arms

trafficking and the increase in gun crimes committed by members of street gangs

The gun violence and deadly shootings that have been plaguing Montreal’s metropolitan

area in recent months, leaving many victims in their wake, show that the federal

government is not doing enough to manage illegal arms trafficking and gun control. On

7 December 2021, a Bloc Québécois motion was passed unanimously by the House of

Commons, instructing the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security to

undertake as a priority a study on gun control, illegal arms trafficking and the increase in

gun crimes committed by members of street gangs and to report on constructive and

practical solutions to the Government of Canada.

Throughout the study, the Bloc Québécois kept the focus on border security, since

hundreds of illegal firearms cross the Canada–US border every week. Evidence suggests

that most of these illegal weapons are finding their way into the hands of members of

street gangs, which is contributing to the violence taking place in the Montreal area. The

Bloc Québécois also called for the Mohawk Council of Akwesasne and the Akwesasne

Mohawk Police Service to be heard, given the unique considerations of the community’s

territory, which straddles the borders of Quebec, Ontario and the United States.

The Bloc Québécois would like to thank all the witnesses who appeared as part of this

important study. It hopes that the recommendations in this report will be implemented

by the federal government in order to effect real change that ensures the safety of

communities and puts an end to gun violence for once and for all. We believe it is

important to take decisive action so that everyone can live in a society where they feel

safe. While the Bloc Québécois agrees with the recommendations made in this report,

we believe that additional clarifications are needed. This supplementary report calls on

the federal government to respect the jurisdiction of Quebec and the provinces and to

support and fund their initiatives instead of competing with them.

The Bloc Québécois believes that Recommendation 19 should be reworded as follows:

- That the Government of Canada ensure that border surveillance of international

commercial rail operations and ocean freight shipping operations is enhanced.

Further to Recommendation 20, the Bloc Québécois proposes:

- That the Government of Canada expand the mandate of Canada Border Services

Agency (CBSA) officers to include seizing more illegal weapons at the border.

Further to Recommendation 22, the Bloc Québécois proposes:

- That the Government of Canada amend the definition of prohibited firearms

within the Criminal Code to define an assault weapon in order to make weapons

not covered by the May 2020 orders illegal (e.g., WK180).

The Bloc Québécois believes that Recommendation 24 should be reworded as follows:

- That the Government of Canada implement, as soon as possible, the mandatory

buyback program promised as part of the ban on assault-style firearms

announced on 1 May 2020.

Further to Recommendation 26, the Bloc Québécois proposes:

- That the Government of Canada amend the necessary legislation regarding

firearms magazines that can be easily modified, in order to make them illegal,

which would ensure that the maximum legal capacity could no longer be

exceeded with simple modifications.

Furthermore, the Bloc Québécois proposes:

- That the Government of Canada take into consideration the recommendations

of this report and introduce a bill to amend the Criminal Code, the Firearms Act

and other federal statutes as soon as possible, in order to formalize its

commitments involving gun control with a view to protecting Quebeckers and

Canadians from the harms associated with firearms.

- That the Government of Canada grant the provinces the authority to ban

handguns.

- That the Government of Canada create a forum for collaboration and

information sharing between various police forces and organizations involved in

the fight against firearms trafficking.

Gun Control, Illegal Arms Trafficking and

the Increase in Gun Crimes by Members of Street Gangs

Supplementary Report of the New Democratic Party

New Democrats support the recommendations contained in this report and reiterate that the

Government of Canada must implement measures for tougher gun control and to curb the flow

of illegal arms trafficking to make our communities safe.

We offer the following additional comments and recommendations to supplement the report,

to further the goal of tackling gun crime among gangs as it relates to the illicit drug trade, with a

specific focus on the opioid epidemic, where stronger action is required. The opioid epidemic

must be declared as a national public health emergency, as it has accurately been categorized

by the Province of British Columbia.

While the Committee recognized that drug addiction is an important contributor to gun

violence, and must be treated as a public health issue, the Government of Canada must go

further than this.

The testimony of Vancouver Police Department Staff Sergeant Michael Rowe identified a

definite link between gun violence and the popularity, addictive nature, and profitability of

fentanyl.

Through his testimony Chief Evan Bray, Chief of Police, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police

(CACP), reiterated the CACP’s 2020 bold call for the decriminalization of simple possession,

noting that criminalizing people who use drugs doesn’t work, and adding that providing the

support to individuals suffering with addiction can free up police resources to do other work in

the community.

Deputy Chief of Police, Myron Demkiw, Toronto Police Service, also testified about the need for

“safe supply and wraparound services.”

We must heed the words of our first responders and frontline workers. By moving away from

prohibition and punishment and instead adopting a national harm reduction approach,

including decriminalization, to substance use and addiction, Canada could ensure access to safe

supply, realize a reduction in risk of overdose deaths, and divert encounters with law

enforcement. Confronting the highly profitable and highly deadly use of substances like

fentanyl with a national harm reduction approach to substance use will significantly impact the

firearms violence that is all too often associated with gangs vying for control of the illicit drug

trade in our communities.

SECU, Evidence, February 10, 2022 (Staff Sergeant, Michael Rowe, Vancouver Police Department)

SECU, Evidence, February 8, 2022 (Chief Evan Bray, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police)

SECU, Evidence, February 8, 2022 (Deputy Chief Myron Demkiw, Toronto Police Service)